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The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. . . .1
Milling among the tourists and homeless in Lafayette Park across
from the White House in the mid-1980s was a protester carrying a sign with
a unique political message: “Arrest Me. I Question the Validity of the Public
Debt. Repeal Section 4, Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”2
Although we can safely dismiss the protester’s tongue-in-cheek concern that
§ 4 overrides the First Amendment, the mock protest makes two points
worth noting. First, the wording of the first sentence of § 4 is open to a wide
range of interpretation. And second, the section has become obscure, less
likely to be cited in policy discussion3 than in a Washington joke.
“The validity of the public debt . . . shall not be questioned.” This
Article argues that these words mean that the government must be able to
meet its fiscal commitments and applies this interpretation to assorted
aspects of congressional fiscal management. After all, some might say that
since the 1980s, the congressional budget process itself has become a
Washington joke. Congress and the President compete over budget policy in
a high-stakes game of fiscal chicken.4 Deficits add to an accumulating debt5
that is sure to escalate beyond the time horizons of balanced-budget plans.6
And politicians agree only on the sanctity of entitlement spending,7 even as
1U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV, § 4. Section 4 continues:
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but
all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
2See Irvin Molotsky, Lafayette Park: Not Just Another Pretty Postcard, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1984, at A13.
3Indeed, the protester’s cryptic reference is the only citation of Section 4 in LEXIS/NEXIS’s
New York Times database.
4See Stephen Barr & Michael A. Fletcher, Government Shuts Again After Talks Collapse,
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1995, at A1; Jackie Calmes & David Rogers, Federal Offices Are
Preparing for Shutdown, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995, at A2 (anticipating possibility of
government shutdown and bond default). At the end of the latest impasse, Congress blinked.
By then, the government had shut down twice, but avoided default on its bonds. See Monica
Borkowski, The Budget Truce: Status Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1996, at A22;
Christopher Georges, Congress Passes Debt-Ceiling Measure, Agrees to Spend More on
Social Security, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1996, at A12.
5The 1996 budget deficit has been projected at $144 billion. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1997-2006 at xviii (1996).
6Both the President and Congress have unveiled plans that they claim would balance the
budget by 2002. The Congressional Budget Office projects, however, that deficits will climb
after 2002, especially beginning in about 2010 with the retirement of the baby-boom
generation. See id. at xxv.
7See, e.g., Robert Bixby, The Missing Debate: Hard Choices on Entitlements, ST.
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economists warn that the United States of the twenty-first century will be
unable to deliver on its twentieth century promises.8
In short, the budget process needs mending.9 But in none of these
areas does reform of congressional practice require a constitutional
amendment10 or a sudden congressional commitment to fiscal soundness.
Rather, reform can evolve from the first sentence of § 4, the Constitution’s
Public Debt Clause.11 More prominent provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment have long overshadowed the Clause,12 assumed to be an
anachronism13 from a war whose fiscal rifts healed faster than its emotional
PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 1D.
8See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 5, at xxiii (“The path of spending and
revenues . . . clearly cannot be sustained because the debt-to-GDP ratio spirals out of control
after 2030.”).
9For an assessment of budget process reform proposals, see Philip G. Joyce & Robert D.
Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 429 (1992).
10The primary constitutional reform proposal has been the proposed Balanced Budget
Amendment. See S.J. Res 1, 105th Cong. (1997); S.J. Res. 1, 104th Cong. (1995). In 1995,
the Amendment failed in the Senate, effectively one vote short of the needed two-third
majority. See 141 CONG. REC. S3310-13 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1995). The subsequent
November, 1996 elections led to an increase in the Republicans’ Senate majority, bringing
speculation that a balanced-budget amendment might now have enough votes to pass that
body. See Eric Pianin & Guy Gugliotta, Budget Amendment Gets Warmer Climate, WASH.
POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at A4. The proposal, however, failed again by one vote. See 143 CONG.
REC. S1922 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 1997); David E. Rosenbaum, Republicans' Budget Amendment
Is Headed for Defeat in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1997, at A1 (reporting Sen. Robert
Torricelli’s announcement reneging on campaign promise to support Balanced Budget
Amendment).
Legal scholars have debated whether a Balanced Budget Amendment would be
wise and effective. See Theodore P. Seto, Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment
That Does What It Is Supposed To—And No More, 106 YALE L.J. 1449 (1997) (describing
proposed Amendment as potentially unenforceable and as poorly drafted); Donald B. Tobin,
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State
Experiences, 12 J.L. & Pol. 153 (1996) (asserting that judicial intervention in budget matters
will bring unintended consequences); Gay Aynesworth Crosthwait, Note, Article III
Problems in Enforcing the Balanced Budget Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1065 (1983);
David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amendment: The
Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563 (1996) (comparing different states’
balanced budget amendments).
11The provision is so obscure in Fourteenth Amendment scholarship that no commentator
appears even to have taken the trouble to name it. In seeking to revitalize the Clause, this
Article at least remedies this neglect.
12Even at the turn of the century, treatises on the Fourteenth Amendment ignored the Clause.
See, e.g., HENRY BRANNON, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (1901) (quoting
Fourteenth Amendment as containing only Sections 1 and 5).
13In this sense, the Clause is assumed to be the Reconstruction analogue of a provision in the
original Constitution: “All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this
Constitution, as under the Confederation.” U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 1. Placing aside the
possibility of a lingering debt from the eighteenth century, this provision is no longer
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scars. While the Clause did arise in the peculiar context of Reconstruction,
this Article argues that it remains applicable today and that it could
transform the Fiscal Constitution14 by adding an intertemporal constraint to
the budget process. This constraint would enhance congressional power by
allowing Congress to tie its own hands with irrevocable budgetary
promises,15 and accordingly would reduce Congress’s power by blocking it
from repudiating or jeopardizing such commitments.
Part I argues that the Public Debt Clause applies beyond
Reconstruction. Although there are few historical records available to help
us discern the Framers’ intention, the history of the Clause’s adoption shows
that Congress did not intend to limit its applicability to Civil War debt, but
rather sought to embed fiscal honor within the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has considered the Clause in just one case,16 but its decision in that
case reaffirms the Clause’s vitality and legitimizes its future development.
Part II argues for a broad reading of the Clause. The language and history of
the Clause show that the “public debt” can include more than just bonds,
and that formal repudiation need not occur for its validity to have been
questioned.
Part III applies the Public Debt Clause to problems in the budget
process. The most obvious consequence of taking the Clause seriously
would be that a governmental failure to make debt payments, which seemed
possible during the budget impasse over the fiscal year 1996 budget, would
be unconstitutional. More broadly, the Clause renders unconstitutional the
federal debt-limit statute that makes default possible. Beyond fixing a
broken budget process, the Public Debt Clause could serve as a partial

operative. However, the decision of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment not to echo
this provision by using the phrase “before the Adoption of this article,” as they chose to echo
other provisions in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, suggests that they sought to
establish a broader principle in the first sentence of § 4. The second sentence of § 4, of
course, has little applicability today.
14For assessments of restrictions that the Constitution imposes on the budget process, see
Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988); Kenneth Dam, The
American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (1977). Professor Dam defines the
“Fiscal Constitution” as including “Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution,
key framework legislation, and implicit understandings derived from existing practice.”
Dam, supra, at 271. The irony of this definition is that though it is part of the Constitution
and relates to fiscal matters, the Public Debt Clause is not yet part of the Fiscal Constitution.
15The economic notion that a government may benefit by “tying its hands,” i.e. providing an
institutional mechanism that forces a government to stick to its initial policy commitments,
has received more attention in the context of monetary than in the context of fiscal policy.
See Robert Barro & David Gordon, Rules, Discretion, and Reputation in a Model of
Monetary Policy, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 101 (1983) (developing theory); Francesco
Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, The Advantage of Tying One’s Hands: EMS Discipline and
Central Bank Credibility, 32 EUR. ECON. REV. 1055 (1982) (applying theory to European
Monetary System).
16Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
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substitute for a Balanced Budget Amendment. More speculatively, the
Clause might preclude repudiation of entitlement promises.
Without an enforcement mechanism, the unconstitutionality of
various governmental practices under the Public Debt Clause would be
irrelevant. Part IV addresses justiciability issues. By protecting bondholders,
the Clause designates a class of individuals with standing to challenge the
government’s compliance with the Clause. Other potential bars to
jurisdiction, including sovereign immunity, the political questions doctrine,
ripeness, and separation-of-powers considerations, do not preclude judicial
involvement.
Some might say that the U.S. budgetary process has operated since
the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification in blissful ignorance of the Clause.
Constitutional provisions can rise to prominence in unexpected ways,
however, and public disgust with “government as usual”17 could make this
an ideal time for enforcing the Clause.
I.

The Continuing Vitality of the Public Debt Clause

This Part shows that the Public Debt Clause established not a
transitional rule for Reconstruction, but a fiscal constraint for all time.
Section I.A uses historical evidence to argue that the Framers intended the
Clause to be applicable beyond the Reconstruction period. Section I.B
reviews the limited jurisprudence addressing the Clause and concludes that
it does not contradict and may encourage a broad interpretation. Finally,
Section I.C argues that desuetude has not sapped the Clause of its meaning,
and that normative considerations may add additional support to this
Article’s interpretation.
A.

The History of the Public Debt Clause

The Public Debt Clause emerged not from a congressional debate
about the dynamics of the Fiscal Constitution, but from a Thirty-Ninth
Congress focused on reconstructing a war-ravaged nation. It is not
surprising then that no member of the House or Senate commented for the
record18 on the Clause’s consequences for posterity.19 This lack of
17See,

e.g., Brigid Schulte, Disgust at All-Time High, Polls Find, Knight-Ridder News
Service, Dec. 19, 1995; Lee Walczak, The New Populism, BUSINESS WEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at
72 (assessing increasing distrust of politicians).
18Aside from the Congressional Globe, which recorded statements on the floor of the House
and Senate, the primary source of information about the Congress’s intent is BENJAMIN B.
KENDRICK, THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION (1914),
which contains the proceedings of the joint House-Senate committee that produced an initial
draft of the Fourteenth Amendment.
19The limited discussion in Congress on the Fourteenth Amendment is a problem not just for
Public Debt Clause scholarship, but for examinations of more prominent parts of the
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articulation does not mean that the Framers sought to modify the
Constitution for only the crisis at hand, as some have assumed.20 Rather, it
demands attention to the evolution of § 4’s language and the context in
which Congress crafted its words. Indeed, the only scholar to examine the
Clause’s history tentatively concludes that “the intention was to lay down a
constitutional canon for all time in order to protect and maintain the national
honor and to strengthen the national credit.”21 In the context of the Equal
Protection Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized the broad applicability
of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 The historical records suggest that
Congress chose to do in the Public Debt Clause what it did in § 1 of the
Amendment--set forth a general principle as applicable today as in
Reconstruction.
1.

Evolution of the Clause in Congress

The present version of the Public Debt Clause emerged whole with
little explanation during the final Senate floor debate on the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 While the history is therefore insufficient to answer many
questions about the provision,24 there are enough clues to justify confidence
that the Clause applies to debts incurred after the Civil War. On its face, the
provision appears to apply to the entire public debt, including war-related
debts but not excluding other debts. Distinctions between the final wording
and the language of earlier versions of § 4 suggest that the general wording
was not accidental. In particular, the previous version of the Clause25
Amendment as well. See, e.g., JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192 (1951) (“Considering the character of the contemplated action
and the fact that a constitutional amendment was at stake, very little was said on the floor of
either House, and what was said related primarily to the more obviously political sections of
the proposal.”).
20See, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, Comparative and International Aspects of American Gold
Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 85 (1934) (asserting that Public Debt Clause “does not
seem to proclaim a principal [sic] of legal philosophy, but to envisage a particular situation
existing at the time of its enactment (1866).”). Professor Nussbaum offered no evidence for
his interpretation.
21Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 15
(1933).
22See, e.g., San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R.R., 116 U.S. 138 (1882) (repudiating
theory that Equal Protection Clause related only to blacks).
23See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040. The final language was drafted by Sen.
Clark, who also synthesized the debt validity and debt repudiation provisions, which were
previously two separate sections, into § 4.
24As one scholar has concluded in reference to § 4, “We are on an uncharted sea and . . . it
would be hazardous to venture on any dogmatic assertions.” Eder, supra note 21, at 4.
25This version, approved during debate on June 4, 1866, read: “The obligations of the United
States, incurred in suppressing insurrection, or in defense of the Union, or for payment of
bounties or pensions incident thereto, shall remain inviolate.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2938-41.
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unambiguously limited the Clause’s applicability to debts “incurred in
suppressing insurrection.” The addition of the word “including” suggests at
least a latent congressional preference for a provision of general
applicability.
Indeed, § 4 had evolved to its present state through gradual steps of
increasing generality. An early version26 of § 4 was clearly limited to
repudiating the Confederate debt, reflecting the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction’s apparent lack of concern about the possibility that
repudiation of Union debt was imminent.27 Congress tinkered with the
provision, repudiating debt prospectively from any future insurrections
instead of just from the “late rebellion.”28 More importantly, Congress added
a separate sentence securing the validity of the Union debt.29
Recommending this addition, Sen. Howard said that the provision “not only
accepts honesty as a principle, but indorses [sic] it as the highest and best
policy of the State as well as of individuals.”30
Though a last-minute substitution, the final version of the section
hearkened back to the language of an earlier proposed version of the Public
Debt Clause that never reached a vote in the Senate.31 This version is
26Sen.

Howard initially proposed a debt repudiation provision as an independent
constitutional amendment, which would read:
That the payment of every kind of indebtedness arising or growing out of
the late rebellion, contracted or accruing in aid of it or in order to
promote it, is forever prohibited to the United States and to each of the
states; such indebtedness and all evidences thereof are hereby declared
and in all courts and places shall be held and treated as in violation of
this Constitution, and utterly void and of no effect.
KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 62.
27The Committee, which had jurisdiction over questions related to the readmission of states,
gave prominent consideration to debt issues generally in examining a draft of the proposed
resolution to readmit Tennessee. The first section of the proposed resolution addressed debt
issues, with secession and suffrage provisions relegated to the second through fourth
sections. However, the Committee voted to amend the proposal by eliminating language
preventing the state from repudiating “any debt or obligation contracted or incurred in aid of
the Federal government against said rebellion . . . .” KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 69.
28The change to general language was gradual; an April 20 version of the provision
introduced by Rep. Stevens referred to “Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war
against the Union.” Id. at 84. The final version replaces “the Union” with “the United
States,” thus removing any doubt as to the applicability of the second sentence of § 4 to
future rebellions.
29See supra note 25.
30CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at 3036. Sen. Howard also stated that the provision
was “a proper precaution against the establishment of parties hereafter appealing to the
sordid interests and lowest passions of men . . . .” Id.
31The first sentence of the proposal read:
The public debt of the United States, including all debts or obligations
which have been or may hereafter be incurred in suppressing insurrection
or in carrying on war in defense of the Union, or for payment of bounties
or pensions incident to such war and provided for by law, shall be
inviolable.
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stylistically much closer to the final language than was the penultimate
proposal.32 The drafter of the final version therefore probably used this
earlier proposal rather than the penultimate proposal as a starting point.
Therefore, where the meaning of the earlier proposal is clear and the final
version appears to revert to this meaning, the earlier proposal and the final
version probably share the same meaning. This inference is especially strong
if the penultimate version clearly indicated a meaning different from both
the earlier and final version.33
In fact, the earlier version differed from the penultimate in two
critical ways that suggest it was intended to be generally applicable. First,
the earlier version, like the final version, used the non-exclusive word
“including” to place war debts within the broader category of the public
debt. Second, the last two words of the earlier proposal are “be inviolable”
rather than the retrospectively oriented “remain inviolate.” The statements of
Sen. Wade in support of the earlier proposal also suggest an intent to embed
in the Constitution a general economic principle.34 Because the earlier
proposal was intended to apply beyond Reconstruction and the final version
reverted to similar language, the final version too was probably generally
applicable. The Congress drafting § 4 chose from a menu of linguistic
variants. The subtle but clear distinctions in these variants suggest that
Congress meant to make § 4 applicable beyond Reconstruction.
An argument against the applicability of the Public Debt Clause to
post-Civil War Debt would likely focus on a single statement by the sponsor
of the final language of § 4, agreeing that the new language did not change
the effect of the provision.35 There are three reasons not to focus too much
on this brief comment. First, stylistic changes in constitutional provisions
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2768.
32Compare supra text accompanying note 1, with supra note 25 (penultimate version), and
supra note 31 (earlier version).
33Ordinarily, evidence from drafts of statutory or constitutional provisions can cut two ways.
Either the first version provides evidence of what the drafters meant in the second, or the
change in language suggests that the drafters intended to change the underlying meaning.
With the Public Debt Clause, however, the existence of a meaning shared by the first and
three drafts and a different meaning in the second draft means that both inferences point in
the same direction. Both the similarity between the first and third drafts and the difference
between the second and third suggest that the drafters intended to recapture the original
meaning and discard the second version’s meaning in the final version.
34While Sen. Wade noted specially that the provision would put “the debt incurred in the
civil war on our part under the guardianship of the Constitution,” he added that this would
“give great confidence to capitalists and will be of incalculable pecuniary benefit to the
United States.” Id. at 2769. In other words, the nation would benefit by increasing the
security of its bond issues; this allows the country to borrow more cheaply in the future. This
benefit is irrelevant for past debt accumulation, suggesting that Sen. Wade saw this version
of the Public Debt Clause as providing a prospective benefit.
35After Sen. Clark introduced the proposed substitute that was ultimately passed, Sen.
Johnson said, “I do not understand that this changes at all the effect of the fourth and fifth
sections. The result is the same.” Sen. Clark agreed, “The result is the same.” Id. at 3040.
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are not generally assumed to be without substantive content and thus are not
ignored in favor of penultimate drafts.36 Second, the senator’s statement may
merely indicate that the versions would have the same result for the
purposes of Reconstruction, since the generalization of the language would
have impact only in future times. Third, the Senate rejected a subsequent
proposal to revert the provision to its prior language.37 The significance of
this rejection is unclear, because the proposal focused on changes other than
the reversion of wording in § 4.38 However, the Senate had just voted to
accept the current language, so an independent proposal to revert it would
probably have failed.
2.

The Political and Economic Context of the Framing

Perhaps the Public Debt Clause has become obscure because § 4
contains so many implicit references to the Civil War that readers may
assume that Congress could not have been concerned about anything else in
passing it. However, a congressional desire to impose a permanent
prohibition against default makes sense in the economic and political
context of Reconstruction. Economically, financial instruments were
precarious in the 1860’s. The value of U.S. debt tumbled during the Civil
War;39 while some of the decline may be attributable to the rising interest
rates that accompanied the climb in the national debt, the bonds’ continuing
decline in value as maturity approached suggests skittishness about the
possibility that the United States might default.40 Congressmen professed the
moral necessity of paying the debt,41 but perhaps they felt the need to do so
partly because it was so high.42 A constitutional guarantee provided
meaningful assurance to those who might purchase future government debt.
36See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1993) (rejecting argument that
Committee of Style’s changes should be ignored in favor of second to last draft, because that
would ignore Framers’ decision to pass final draft).
37See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3040.
38Sen. Doolittle’s proposal would have both reverted the provision to its prior language and
allowed states to ratify some but not all sections of the Fourteenth Amendment. The proposal
was defeated, 33-11 with 5 absent. See id.
39Ten-year, six-percent bonds issued in 1858 had declined in value 14% by 1861, 36% by
1862, and 46% by 1864. See DOUGLAS B. BALL, FINANCIAL FAILURE AND CONFEDERATE
DEFEAT 132 (1991).
40See George T. McCandless, Jr., Money, Expectations, and the U.S. Civil War, 86 AM.
ECON. REV. 661 (1996) (arguing that war news was primary determinant of value of Northern
and Southern currency).
41The House of Representatives had earlier voted 162-1 to approve a resolution calling the
public debt “sacred and inviolate” and urging “that any attempt to repudiate or in any manner
to impair or scale the debt, shall be universally discountenanced, and promptly rejected by
Congress if proposed.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10.
42The debt had climbed from $64.8 million in 1860 to $2.76 billion in 1866. See JAMES D.
SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS & AMERICAN POLITICS 288 (1988).
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The Public Debt Clause also reflects the Thirty-Ninth Congress’s
almost religious commitment to hard-money principles. The financial
exigencies of the War had led to passage of the Legal Tender Acts43 and the
resulting issue of greenbacks, though in ordinary fiscal times Treasury
Secretary Chase and Congress would never have tolerated the distribution of
Treasury notes not convertible to gold or silver.44 After the War, Congress
passed a resolution, by a vote of 144-6, urging a return to the former
monetary regime in which paper was backed by metal.45 Although the
greenbacks’ convenience relative to bank drafts thwarted Congress’s
resolution to cash them in,46 the Thirty-Ninth Congress surely remembered
both the difficulty that the Treasury had experienced in borrowing money47
and the wartime Congress’s fiscal gluttony. The Public Debt Clause served
to demonstrate that Congress remained committed to sound financial
management.
Underlying the Framers’ political concern in § 4 is the ironic
electoral calculus that members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress faced. Victory
on the battlefields did not bring political security to the Republicans, but
rather the prospect that they might lose their hold on Congress. In freeing
the slaves, the Emancipation Proclamation48 unraveled the Three-Fifths
43Act of Feb. 25, 1862, ch. 33, 12 Stat. 345; Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 142, 12 Stat. 532; Act
of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 73, 12 Stat. 709.
44See generally BRAY HAMMOND, SOVEREIGNTY AND AN EMPTY PURSE: BANKS AND POLITICS
IN THE CIVIL WAR 165-229 (1970) (describing Treasury and Congress’s reluctant accession to
Legal Tender Acts); MARGARET G. MYERS, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
150 (1970) (describing Chase as “a hard-money man, as suspicious of bank paper as Jackson
and Benton had been”). Even after Treasury Secretary Chase became Chief Justice Chase, he
never became entirely comfortable with the Legal Tender Acts, which the Supreme Court
initially found unconstitutional in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870),
overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871). See generally Kenneth W.
Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 367.
45See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 75.
46Congress faced “a sudden, impatient, popular belief--quite opposite to the Jacksonian hardmoney notions previously prevailing and to the intent of the war-time advocates of the notes-that an abundant currency based simply on federal credit and the country’s worth was
required for the general good.” HAMMOND, supra note 44, at 253.
47Because there had been no national bank since the Jackson Administration, the Lincoln
Administration could not simply auction off debt to the highest bidder. Rather, the federal
government resorted to commercial banks. Despite high levels of reserves, these banks were
hesitant about lending to the federal government, because “they faced a revolutionary change
in their business, with a different kind of borrower.” HAMMOND, supra note 44, at 76. The
problem was exacerbated by federally imposed specie rules, which required the federal
government to take physical control of gold when it borrowed, instead of merely receiving
credit on the bank’s books like other borrowers. Id. at 59-70. The amount borrowed grew so
high that the banks were unable to meet the government’s demand for specie, resulting in
delays in the United States’s payment of creditors, employees, and suppliers. Id. at 162.
48While the Thirteenth Amendment’s ratification in 1865 assured the immediate goal of the
Proclamation itself, the purpose that unifies the various provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment was the securing of the remaining “fruits of the war.” See KENDRICK, supra note
18, at 266-67 (listing civil rights and debt provisions among victory spoils that all
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Compromise49 and thus increased the population base that determined the
South’s representation.50 Repudiation of rebel debt was consistent with
Republican interpretations of existing law,51 but a Democratic Congress
conceivably might have honored the debt or might even have repudiated the
Union debt. To minimize the chance of a Democratic resurgence, the
Congress included Sections 2 and 3 in the Fourteenth Amendment.52 Thus,
the probability of repudiation of the Union debt in the absence of § 4 was
small.53 But the insertion of the uncontroversial54 § 4 did more than provide
insurance precluding a future Congress from retreating on the Thirty-Ninth
Congress’s commitment to repay the national debt.55 Just as important, the
provision cemented the North’s military victory with a rhetorical one by
declaring Confederate obligations (and thus the Confederacy itself) “illegal
and void” and by elevating the United States to the fiscal high road.
Republicans sought); see also TENBROEK, supra note 19, at 184 (noting that Congressmen
wanted to place achievements of civil rights bills beyond reach of shifting Congressional
majorities).
49See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (counting slaves as three-fifths persons for purpose of
representation in House).
50Rep. Conkling estimated that the South would gain twelve representatives by
Emancipation, in addition to the eighteen representatives that the South previously was
allotted on account of its slave population. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 356-59
(1866). In addition, each rebel state’s entitlement to two senators upon readmission was
beyond even the power of a constitutional amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. V (prohibiting
amendments depriving unconsenting states of equal suffrage in Senate).
51See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3036 (arguing that invalidity of rebel debt
reflected common law principle that agreements founded on immoral consideration are
unenforceable). Rep. Miller, however, had earlier noted that if the rebel states were
considered to have left the Union and were then reannexed, principles of international law
would demand assumption of the states’ debts. Id. at 2087.
52Section 2 provided that representation in the House would be proportionately diminished
when males over 21 years old were excluded from the franchise. Section 3 prohibited many
Confederate officers and officials from membership in Congress.
53Arguing against what became § 4, Sen. Saulsbury asked, “Does the Senator from Nevada
say that the Democratic party of this country would, if they had it in their power, repudiate
the national debt or would assume the confederate debt? I should like a frank answer.” Sen.
Stewart of Nevada did not answer the question. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2800
(1866). See also id. at 2940 (statement of Sen. Hendricks) (“Who has attacked public credit,
or questions the obligation to pay the public debt?”). Testimony before the Joint Committee,
however, indicated that Southerners hoped to repudiate the Union debt if the Democrats
regained Congress, but would settle for like treatment of Union and Confederate debt.
KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 283.
54Section 4 was the subject of little comment on the floor of Congress largely because of its
uncontroversiality. After extensive discussion of other provisions of the Amendment, Rep.
Stevens noted simply, “The fourth section, which renders inviolable the public debt and
repudiates the rebel debt, will secure the approbation of all but traitors.” CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3148; see also id. at 2530 (statement of Sen. Randall).
55Congress acted on its intent to repay much of the Civil War debt at about the same time
that it was considering the Fourteenth Amendment by passing a statute permanently
appropriating funds to pay off much of it. See Act of May 2, 1866, ch. 70, § 2, 14 Stat. 41,
41–42.
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Jurisprudence on the Public Debt Clause

The Supreme Court has expounded on the Public Debt Clause just
once, in Perry v. United States.56 Subsection I.B.1 narrates the facts and
holding of the case, and Subsection I.B.2 argues that while Perry and
subsequent decisions are inconclusive, they do not threaten and may
strengthen the Clause’s vitality.
1.

Perry v. United States

Perry was one of the Gold Clause Cases, which concerned bonds
issued by Congress that included a “gold clause” stipulating, “The principal
and interest hereof are payable in United States gold coin of the present
standard of value.”57 When gold subsequently appreciated vis-à-vis the
dollar, Congress retreated, finding “payment in gold or a particular kind of
coin or currency [to be] against public policy,”58 and providing for payment
in dollars only. Perry, a bondholder, sued for the dollar equivalent of the
gold he would have received at the earlier exchange rates.
The Supreme Court held the Public Debt Clause applicable:
While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire
to put beyond question the obligations of the Government
issued during the Civil War, its language indicates a
broader connotation. We regard it as confirmatory of a
fundamental principle, which applies as well to the
government bonds in question, and to others duly
authorized by the Congress, as to those issued before the
Amendment was adopted.59
The Court used the Public Debt Clause as support for a structural argument
that the Constitution did not allow the federal government to change the
terms of its bonds. The Court rested most heavily on the clause of the
unamended Constitution authorizing Congress “to borrow Money on the
credit of the United States.”60 The Court noted, “The binding quality of the
promise of the United States is of the essence of the credit which is so
pledged. . . . ” Having this power to authorize the issue of definite
obligations . . . the Congress has not been vested with authority to alter or
destroy those obligations.”61
56294

U.S. 330 (1935).
at 347.
58Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 48 Stat. 113.
59294 U.S. at 354.
60U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
61294 U.S. at 353.
57Id.
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Perry’s Jurisprudential Vitality

The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to reconsider
Perry’s assessment of the Public Debt Clause, so it is unclear whether a
future Court would agree that the Clause was applicable beyond the Civil
War. An attack on Perry’s relevance would note a set of recent lower-court
cases finding the Public Debt Clause inapplicable, the peculiar timing of
Perry, and the decision’s primary reliance on the “borrow Money” Clause.
None of these arguments seriously undermines Perry, however. In the end,
of course, courts might or might not adopt this Article’s interpretation of the
Clause, but there is nothing in the case law that would require a court to find
the Clause inapplicable or to reject a broad reading of the Clause.
Several federal appellate courts in 1989–90 declined to apply the
Clause in cases involving a federal program providing reinsurance to statedesignated student loan guarantee agencies.62 After Congress created new
provisions with which several agencies failed to comply, the Secretary of
Education withheld guarantee payments. Because the agreements with the
agencies bound them to any changed statutes or regulations63 and allowed
the Secretary to punish violations with such withholdings, the courts
probably correctly found that no debt was violated.64 Commenting on the
Clause, two appellate courts implied that it remained applicable,65 while two
district courts noted the Clause’s Civil War origins and suggested it applied
only to bond debt.66 None of the decisions carefully assesses the history or
language of the Clause, so it is difficult to determine to what extent the
courts would have agreed with this Article’s arguments. But no court argued
that Perry should be overruled, thus suggesting that it remains good law.
Perry was decided at the height of the constitutional crisis between
the Roosevelt Administration and the Court over new Deal legislation, two
years before the “switch in time that saved nine.”67 In post-1937 cases, the
Court backed away from earlier activist stances limiting the government’s

62See Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1990); Ohio Student
Loan Comm’n v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990) (reversing district court application
of Clause); Colorado v. Cavazos, Civ. A. No. 88-C-207, 1990 WL 367621 at *5 (D. Colo.
Aug. 21, 1990); Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d 919 F.2d 137
(3d Cir. 1990).
63See, e.g., Great Lakes, 911 F.2d at 12 n.1.
64This accords with an interpretation of the Clause as allowing Congress to reserve the right
to modify its debt. See infra Section II.C.
65See Great Lakes, 911 F.2d at 17 (“This section is only brought into play when some state
or federal government agency questions a debt.”); Ohio Student Loan, 900 F.2d at 902
(“[B]ecause we find no abrogation of the ‘contract’ in the instant case, we conclude that there
was no violation of section four of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
66See Colorado v. Cavazos, 1996 WL at *5; Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp at 244–45.
67See generally David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal,
1931–1940, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 504 (1987) (discussing Court activism and retrenchment).
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ability to craft economic policy.68 But this Article’s reading of the Public
Debt Clause is hardly comparable to the Court’s activist interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Moreover, the Perry Court
appeared determined not to upset governmental policy and ultimately did
not award Perry damages. Because there was no free domestic market for
gold, the majority reasoned, Perry would not have been able to sell any gold
on the hypothetical world market on which his calculations were based.69
That the Perry Court’s analysis of the Public Debt Clause was one
support for a broader argument that the Constitution precludes debt
repudiations does not narrow its relevance. Just because there are additional
reasons that the repudiation in Perry was unconstitutional does not change
that, according to the Court, the Public Debt Clause confirmed the
unconstitutionality of repudiation. Moreover, although Perry concerns only
direct repudiation of bonds, its holding lends credence to Part II’s expansive
interpretation of the Public Debt Clause. For if the Constitution already
banned debt repudiation, then restricting the Public Debt Clause to outright
repudiation of bonds, rather than allowing it to encompass non-bond
obligations or extend to actions placing debts into question, would be
redundant.
C.

Interpreting the Public Debt Clause Today

This Part so far has engaged originalist, textualist, and precedential
methodologies to interpret the Public Debt Clause. There are many
approaches to constitutional interpretation, however, and the Clause may be
vulnerable to minimalist construction by those who would assess it by
relying on historical practice or on normative considerations. After all,
Perry was the only exception to the otherwise uneventful history of the
Clause, and though Part III of this Article suggests that the Clause could
reform the budget process, the practices that may need reform have long,
largely unquestioned histories. Moreover, if the Public Debt Clause would
disturb the tranquil continuity of these practices, perhaps it is best to leave it
alone. Both of these claims are contestable, however, and the following two
subsections address critiques of the Public Debt Clause that focus on
desuetude or on normative considerations.

68See,

e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("We have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies . . . .").
69Id. at 357. Four dissenters argued that the government ought to pay damages. Id. at 369-70
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). See also Currie, supra note 67, at 536 n.161 (calling finding of
no damages “bizarre”).
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Desuetude

Concerns about desuetude are generally less applicable in a
constitutional context than in a statutory one.70 When a statute falls into
disuse, it may no longer reflect the consensus of society.71 Constitutional
provisions are inherently countermajoritarian, binding one generation to at
least the words chosen by another. In addition, while an outdated criminal
law may be enforced arbitrarily,72 this danger does not inhere in
constitutional law. Perhaps recognizing these arguments, the Supreme Court
has held that longstanding government practice does not waive a
constitutional violation.73
In some contexts, the potentially destabilizing nature of
constitutional adjudication presents a unique desuetude concern not
generally applicable to statutory construction,74 but revitalization of the
Public Debt Clause does not threaten the existing constitutional order.
Active reconsideration of some obscure constitutional provisions might be
dangerous because those provisions are so open-ended that if the courts
were to consider them, damaging uncertainty about the structure of
government would result. For example, the Constitution’s Guarantee
Clause75 could conceivably be interpreted to disallow a wide range of state
practices viewed as undemocratic.76 Even if such an interpretation were
correct, adjudication of such claims could mean that the structure of state
governments would be modified whenever the composition of the Supreme
Court changed and constitutional doctrine surrounding the Clause evolved.
Such considerations may underlie the Supreme Court’s holdings that

70For arguments that obsolescent statutes should be nullified because of desuetude, see
GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); Corey R. Chivers,
Desuetude, Due Process, and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 449.
71See CALABRESI, supra note 70, at 2, 21.
72See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 153 (1962) (arguing that obsolete statutes are subject to
discriminating enforcement).
73See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983).
74Destabilization was potentially of particular concern in Chadha, because a wide range of
statutory schemes assumed the constitutionality of the legislative veto, but the Court found
the veto unconstitutional nonetheless.
75U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government . . . .”)
76See, e.g., Debra F. Salz, Note, Discrimination-Prone Initiatives and the Guarantee Clause:
A Role for the Supreme Court, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 100 (1993) (arguing that Colorado’s
Amendment 2 violated the Guarantee Clause); see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Central
Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749 (1994) (“The concept [of Republican
Government] is indeed a spacious one, and many particular ideas can comfortably nestle
under its big tent.”).
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Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable.77 Because passage of a statute
requires the approval of both houses of Congress and approval by the
President (or a veto override), congressional resolution of Guarantee Clause
claims may be more final than Supreme Court rulings, and it may therefore
be wise for the courts not to hear constitutional claims where finality in
constitutional principle is particularly important.78 Even more importantly,
an invalidation of a state practice might lead to questioning of statutes
passed as a result of that practice, leading to considerable confusion.
Though the Public Debt Clause could help shape the Fiscal
Constitution, its potential is not destabilizing. A ruling that a particular
statute violated the Public Debt Clause would result simply in the
invalidation of that statute. The Public Debt Clause implicates the powers of
Congress, but not the structure of government, and it thus has no more
destabilizing potential than any other constitutional provision. In addition,
the Clause protects against government action that presumably would occur
rarely even in the Clause’s absence. That the Supreme Court has not
regularly applied the Clause does not mean that Congress has relied on its
ability to ignore its debt obligations; to the contrary, the Clause’s dormancy
indicates that Congress generally has recognized its moral, and perhaps
constitutional, duty to pay its debts.
2.

Normative Arguments

Normative concerns need not entrench the status quo, and there is
thus no reason to assume that it is best to leave government running as it
has. A full normative assessment of a principle requiring the government to
follow through on its fiscal promises is beyond the scope of this Article. The
basic case for such a provision, however, is simple: By allowing Congress to
tie its own hands, the Clause increases the credibility of congressional
promises and improves the nation’s credit rating. People will be less
inclined to hold and purchase government debts if they believe that the
government will not honor those obligations.79
77See

Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (holding that determination of which of
two rival claimants was rightful government of Rhode Island required congressional
resolution); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (reaffirming that
Guarantee Clause claims are not justiciable); see also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that political questions doctrine is based on
prudential concerns).
78The counterargument is that the Supreme Court may decline to overrule constitutional
holdings where there is a strong social interest in finality. Cf. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
503 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (arguing that constitutional stare decisis has particular force where
a “rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences
of overruling”).
79The counterargument is also simple: What happens if Congress ties its hands and lives to
regret it? Under this Article’s interpretation of the Public Debt Clause, Congress must refrain
from crafting policies that would violate the Clause, even if those policies would be in the
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Moreover, this Article is premised on a belief that several areas of
congressional budget practice require reform. Admittedly, this normative
basis is not perfectly aligned with the values that the Public Debt Clause
protects. In a sense, Part III uses the principle of fiscal honor as the fount of
a legal argument for the related but distinct principle of sound fiscal
management. A normative argument against either principle might provide a
counterweight to this Part’s historical and textual interpretation of the Public
Debt Clause, but accepting these principles adds purpose and urgency to this
Part’s historical and textual interpretations.
II.

The Meaning of the Public Debt Clause

The history of the Public Debt Clause contributes only to an
understanding of the temporal scope of the provision. Assuming the Clause
remains in force today leaves additional questions: What constitutes the
“public debt”? And what type of action entails a questioning of the debt’s
validity? These questions, never addressed in a committee report or on the
floor of the Senate, are inherently difficult. One response might be to
construe the Public Debt Clause as narrowly as possible,80 but the language
of § 4, literally read using standard principles of construction,81 demands a
broad application. As Section II.A argues, the Clause encompasses not just
bonds, but also any financial obligation stemming from an agreement.
Meanwhile, Congress need not repudiate a debt to trigger the Clause;
Section II.B shows that if Congress indirectly makes it so that a debt will not
be paid, it has violated the Clause.

national interest. Ultimately, a full normative assessment of the Clause requires balancing its
benefits in improving congressional credibility and its costs in restricting Congress’s policy
options.
80The narrowest possible construction of Public Debt Clause would read it out of the
Constitution altogether, by applying it only to Civil War debt. The Supreme Court, of course,
has never adopted the principle that ambiguity should always be resolved by limiting
constitutional provisions’ scope to circumstances that they unambiguously cover. Cf. 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 405 (1870) (noting need to resolve
ambiguities in Constitution by selecting interpretation that “best harmonizes with the nature
and objects, the scope and design of the instrument.”).
81This Section adopts three interpretive principles to resolve ambiguity. First, interpretations
that would read words or phrases out of the Clause are rejected in preference for
interpretations that consider the meaning of each word. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is
intended to be without effect . . . .”). Second, the presence of a particular word or phrase in
the Clause leads to the assumption that the Framers intended to use that word rather than
another that would correspond to an alternative reading. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. 421, 433 n.12 (1987) (noting strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent
through language it chooses). Third, the meaning of words is construed by reference to the
surrounding words. See, e.g., Neal v. Clarke, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (discussing canon
known as noscitur a sociis).
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Obligations Included Within the Public Debt

To the modern economist, the words “public debt” may connote
only bond obligations; in today’s budget process, “public debt” is a
technical term with a narrow scope.82 Black’s Law Dictionary, however,
defines the public debt as “[t]hat which is due or owing by the government
of a state or nation,”83 and the words of the Public Debt Clause suggest that
the Framers were protecting a similarly broad class of obligations. A key to
understanding the scope of the provision lies in the phrase, “including debts
incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion.” The use of the word “including” rather than “in
addition to” or “and of” shows that the enumerated rebellion-related debts84
delineate the expanse of the phrase “public debt” rather than annexing an
additional category of “debts” to it. In other words, the “including” phrase
indicates that the Framers conceived the “public debt” as including not just
financial instruments, but also such promises as war pensions and
bounties.85 This interpretation is further supported by the use of the words
“debts incurred” rather than, for example, “notes and contracts.” The word
“debts” draws a parallel with the phrase “public debt,” suggesting that the
Framers naturally thought of pensions and bounties as being part of the
“public debt.”
This Article construes the “public debt” to include the ordinary
pensions of government employees and similar government commitments.
82The federal government currently defines “public debt” to include only bond obligations
issued by the Treasury; debt issued by administrative agencies is tallied separately as
“agency debt.” See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, FISCAL YEAR 1996, at 188 (1995) [hereinafter
ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES].
83BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (6th ed. 1990). See also Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 272, 284 (1850) (defining “public debt” as including “debts of every description,
without reference to their origin.”).
84One might construe the phrase “pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion” by applying the “for” phrase to the word “bounties” but not to
“pensions.” This approach would be consistent with the general interpretive rule that a phrase
applies only to its immediate antecedent. See, e.g., Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 877
(4th Cir. 1996). This interpretation would mean that even if the public debt did not ordinarily
include pensions, these are specifically protected by the Public Debt Clause, whether or not
insurrection-related. However, this construction seems forced, considering the parallelism of
the words “pensions” and “bounties.”
85The irony of this interpretation is that the presence of the “including” phrase may explain
why those not scrutinizing § 4 might conclude that the entire section is no longer relevant.
The reference to insurrection or rebellion connects the Public Debt Clause with the second
sentence of § 4, which no longer is generally applicable. But once it is conceded that the
words “validity of the public debt” have general applicability, as argued in Section I.A,
supra, the “including” phrase may be seen as narrowing rather than widening the Public Debt
Clause only if the enumerated items are read exclusively. Such a reading is implausible,
however, since the Clause surely encompasses at least formal debt instruments, which are not
specifically enumerated in the “including” phrase.
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This construction might appear to read out of the Clause the phrase limiting
pensions and bounties to those incurred in suppressing insurrection. This
language was essential, however, because the South claimed that secession
was legal and the suppression of it illegal. Without an unambiguous
syntactic indication that the war-related debts were part of the public debt
authorized by law, the Public Debt Clause would have left open the
possibility that a Democratic Congress could have repudiated the Union’s
Civil War bonds as illegal and not part of the public debt. This appears to
explain the awkward location of “authorized by law” in between the
“including” phrase and “the public debt of the United States.”86 The Framers
sought with that location to clarify that the Civil War origins of “pensions
and bounties” would not keep them out of the “public debt.”
The phrase “authorized by law” and the word “debt” provide
plausible limits on the scope of the Public Debt Clause; while Part III of this
Article does not depend on these limits, it is useful to see that this Part’s
construction of the Clause need not radically change the legal order by
forcing Congress to follow through on all of its earlier intentions. First, a
governmental promise is “authorized by law” only if it is contained in a
congressional statute.87 Second, a debt is “[a] sum of money due by certain
and express agreement.”88 Applying this definition to the Public Debt
Clause, the United States incurs a public debt only if a statute embodies an
agreement, or, more restrictively, only if the government issues a written
agreement.89 Since a gratuitous promise does not ordinarily constitute a
legally enforceable agreement, the Clause could be further limited to
86If

“authorized by law” were moved after the “including” phrase, it could be seen as a limit
on the scope of “pensions and bounties.”
87The phrase “authorized by law” thus applies a common-sense limitation to the Public Debt
Clause that is also found in the law of government contracts, declaring contracts signed by
government employees unenforceable if those employees were unauthorized to sign them.
See, e.g., United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In addition, the
omission of the words “or equity” reinforces the Public Debt Clause’s exclusion of
obligations or claims.
An alternative construction of the phrase “authorized by law” would be that the
phrase restricts the Clause’s applicability to those debts that had already been authorized
before the Amendment’s adoption. Two factors militate against this reading. First, the phrase
“authorized by law” is more naturally construed as a present participial phrase. Cf. Linsalata
v. Clifford, 290 F. Supp. 338, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defining phrase “authorized by law” in
contractual context to contemplate subsequently enacted statutes). Second, if the Framers had
intended explicitly to limit the Clause’s temporal applicability, they could easily have
indicate this intent clearly, for example with the phrase “heretofore accumulated.”
88BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 403 (6th ed. 1990).
89This restriction suggests that the government cannot become an involuntary debtor for
Public Debt Clause purposes through commission of a tort on an individual with which it
does not have a contract. In other words, the Public Debt Clause does not override the
government’s sovereign immunity in tort suits, cf. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15
(1953) (accepting statutory immunity of United States in tort suit), or require that the
government become an involuntary debtor.
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governmental promises made in exchange for good consideration.90 The
requirement of an agreement honors § 4’s distinction among debts,
obligations and claims. While the Public Debt Clause itself uses only the
word “debt,” the second sentence of § 4 uses the terms “debt or obligation”
and the phrase “claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave.” By
including only the first of these within the public debt, the Public Debt
Clause excludes money that the United States ought to pay by virtue merely
of a moral obligation.91
B.

Congressional Actions Triggering the Clause

Once Congress makes a promise that becomes part of the public
debt, its “validity . . . shall not be questioned.”92 But questioned by what? A
nihilistic interpretation would append to the Clause “by this Section,” thus
reducing it to a nullity, but the language of § 4 makes this construction
insupportable.93 A better interpretation, therefore, is that no state action may
question a debt’s validity. This does not resolve, however, what
“questioned” means. Dismissing the Lafayette Park protester’s interpretation
of the word leaves two possibilities. “To question” could mean either “to
repudiate” or “to jeopardize.” As will become clear in Part III, this
distinction is important. The following subsection conceptualizes the choice
between these alternatives, and the three subsections that follow mount an
affirmative case for the preferability and the manageability of the latter.

90Thus,

a statute providing all Californians with a written promise of annual payments of
$500 in perpetuity might not create a public debt.
91This analysis does not resolve the question of whether a moral obligation may rise to the
level of a moral consideration by virtue of a Congressional statute. For example, if Congress
had passed a statute promising to give $500 monthly to Oliver Sipple, credited with saving
the life of President Ford, would that promise have become part of the public debt? See, e.g.,
Hawkes v. Saunders, 98 Eng. Rep. 1091 (1782) (providing classic statement of “moral
consideration” contract doctrine).
92The language echoes the words of the Speech and Debate Clause: “The Senators and
Representatives shall . . . be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of
their respective Houses . . . and for any Speech or debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). Whether this
was intentional or coincidental, it does not much help, since questioning a congressman does
not seem analogous to questioning the public debt.
93First, it is implausible that the Framers could have seen the need to clarify that the second
sentence of § 4 does not invalidate the Union debt, since that sentence clearly invalidates
only debts “incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States.” Second, the
use of the imperative “shall” instead of “is” removes the possibility that the first sentence of
§ 4 merely comments on the second.
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Possible Levels of Generality

The question is at what level of generality the Framers drafted the
Public Debt Clause.94 A provision protecting only Civil War Union debt
would be a low level of generality. By establishing that the Clause does not
apply only to Civil War debt, Section I.A rejected this possibility. An
intermediate level of generality would be a permanent ban on governmental
failure to honor debts. Finally, a high level would be a prohibition not only
of governmental failure to make payments on a debt, but also of government
action that will ultimately lead to such failure.95 Only the high level comes
into play when Congress passes a statute that will cause default on a debt
unless a future Congress changes the statute.96
The following subsections argue for the high level of generality by
discussing the Clause’s language and historical context. Three factors
should be kept in mind in assessing this evidence. First, as defined so far,
“jeopardization” and “repudiation”97 differ only in timing: Congress
jeopardizes debts as soon as it places the government on the road to default,
but repudiation occurs only once Congress fails to change course and the
government reaches the end of that road. There are, however, other ways
one might define “repudiation,” and thus other ways to conceptualize the
difference between the intermediate and high levels of generality. In
particular, “repudiation” could refer to government action that intentionally
leads to debt nonpayment.98 However, there is no reason to read an
94Cf. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1926–28 (1995) (discussing level-of-generality
problem in context of Equal Protection Clause).
95At an even higher level of generality would be a general requirement of sound financial
management, but this is clearly too general because the text of the Clause is concerned only
with “the public debt.” Part II of this Article attempts to achieve some aspects of this general
goal by identifying practices threatening the validity of the debt. This Article does not attack
other governmental practices that might be fiscally undesirable, such as taxation policies that
arguably discourage savings, because these practices are unrelated to the public debt.
96For example, suppose Congress were to repeal a statute providing for the automatic
payment of a debt due a number of years hence. Under the high level of generality, the
statute would be unconstitutional, since it jeopardizes the debt by depending on a future
Congress to unrepeal the statute. Under the intermediate level of generality, the repeal statute
is constitutional; an unconstitutional event would occur only once the government failed to
restore the statute in time to make the payment.
97This Article uses these words as shorthand references for the timing distinction, but
different definitions of these words are possible. For example, “repudiation” might be
defined to occur only when a statute explicitly states that a debt will not be paid. Under this
definition, repudiation would occur in the example of note 96 as soon as the repeal statute
was passed. But if the government failed to make a payment even though a statute required
it, that would not constitute repudiation under this definition. Though this is a plausible
definition of “repudiated,” it is not a plausible interpretation of “validity . . . shall not be
questioned.” See also infra note 110; infra Subsection II.B.2.c.
98“Repudiation” might also refer to action directly leading to debt nonpayment. However,
assessing the directness of a congressional action’s effect on debt really involves assessing
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intentionality requirement into the Public Debt Clause, especially since
assessment of congressional motive is a disfavored method of
interpretation.99 Moreover, much of the evidence that militates against the
intermediate level of generality as defined above also militates against
alternative definitions of the intermediate level.100
Second, there is no smoking gun. Probably, the Framers did not
consider the distinction between the intermediate and high levels directly,
and the proper inquiry is thus which level of generality is more consistent
with the tenor of the Clause and the purposes of Congress. The answer turns
in part on whether Congress envisioned the Clause as a technical rule
allowing bond-holders to recover in court after missed debt payments or as a
more amorphous commitment by the government to ensuring the debt’s
validity. If the Framers intended the Clause only as a technical ban on
nonpayment, the intermediate level of generality is the right one. But if the
Framers intended it as a statement of a broad principle constraining
Congress, the high level is preferable, because that level identifies a
violation of the Clause when Congress contravenes the principle rather than
when this contravention affects debt-holders.101
Third, it is important to avoid making reflexive assumptions. There
is no default rule that constitutional provisions should be interpreted as
narrowly as possible. The advocate of the high level of generality would
bear the burden of proof only if there were some a priori evidence
suggesting that the Framers intended the Public Debt Clause to be narrow.102
timing and intentionality. Saying that a congressional action directly affects a debt means
either that the action affects the debt right away or that Congress meant to legislate about
debt rather than about something else. While the word “directness” might refer to some
combination of these, there is no reason to consider directness independently of timing and
intentionality issues.
99See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 508 (1975) (“Our
cases make clear that in determining the legitimacy of a congressional act we do not look to
the motives alleged to have prompted it.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383–84
& 383 n.30 (noting that Court will generally avoid inquiry into congressional intent in
constitutional cases because different legislators may have different motives in passing
legislation).
100See infra notes 104, 107, and 112; text accompanying notes 115–116 and 121–122.
101A ban on nonpayment furthers the principle of debt validity, but not enough to meet the
demands of a general principle. If Congress fails to ensure the validity of debts, the courts
might be unable to help, and the need to resort to the courts undermines confidence in debt
issues. See infra note 118. Moreover, assuming that Congress did not have a specific
technical ban in mind, there is no reason to read into the Clause a distinction between actions
repudiating and actions jeopardizing debts. Both type of actions mean that Congress has
failed to ensure the debt’s validity, and restricting the Clause to the former entails an
assumption that the Clause directly constrains the courts but not Congress.
102If one were (foolishly) to guess at a level of generality without looking at the Clause’s
language or history, the high level would seem more plausible than the intermediate. First,
the fact that the Framers clearly rejected the low generality level suggests a preference for
more general provisions. Second, the Framers wrote § 1 of the Amendment at perhaps the
broadest level of generality imaginable. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
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Linguistic Evidence

The words of the Public Debt Clause are consistent with an
interpretation that bars statutes jeopardizing the validity of debts. First, the
verb “to question” is closer to the verb “to jeopardize” than it is to the verb
“to repudiate.” Second, the passive construction of the words “shall not be
questioned” indicates an intent to inspire confidence in bond-holders that the
government will take no action interfering with their debts. Third, the word
“validity” implies that the government’s obligation to ensure its credit
extends over the entire time period during which debt obligations are being
held. Fourth, the evolution of the Clause suggests that the Framers chose the
Clause’s words deliberately. The following subsections consider in turn
these linguistic reasons for preferring the high generality level interpretation
of “validity . . . shall not be questioned.”
a.

Meaning of “to Question”

The verb “to question” would be an odd synonym for “to
repudiate.” Questioning a proposition is not equivalent to insisting that the
proposition is false but merely entails suggesting that it might be. To say, “I
question whether your debt will be honored,” is different from saying,
“Your debt will not be honored.” Analogously, to say that a statute must not
question a debt’s validity is different from saying that a statute must not
repudiate a debt.103 Intuitively, the verb “to question” is much closer to the
verb “to undermine” than it is to the alternative “to cancel.”104 Therefore, the
427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) ("[T]he 39th Congress was intent upon establishing in the federal
law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to meet the particular and
immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves."). The Framers not only did not limit § 1
to a constitutionalization of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but did not even limit the Equal
Protection Clause to protecting blacks. Of course, this is hardly conclusive about § 4. But it
suggests that any reflex to assume that provisions were meant narrowly is particularly
inappropriate in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment constitutional provision.
103For another analogy, consider Justice Brandeis’s famous remark: “When the validity of an
act of the Congress is drawn in question . . . this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added). While the similarity in language to the Public Debt Clause is almost surely
coincidental, this quotation helps reveal what it means to question something’s validity.
Justice Brandeis of course did not mean that a statute should be narrowly construed when a
constitutional provision has made it unambiguously of no force; he meant that when it
seemed there might be an issue of constitutionality, the Court would try to avoid that issue.
Likewise, the Public Debt Clause is triggered not only when the government has made it
absolutely clear through a failure to make payment that a debt will not be honored, but also
when the government’s actions effectively raise the issue.
104In addition, nothing in the verb “to question” makes it more like “to undermine
intentionally” than like “to undermine inadvertently.” True, the sentence “I question the
debt,” makes it sound like I am questioning the debt intentionally. But that is only because
the verb has a subject. See infra note 107. By contrast, the phrase “the debt is now
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literal interpretation of the Clause is that a governmental action making
uncertain whether or not a debt will be honored is unconstitutional.105
b.

Passive Construction

The passive construction of the phrase “shall not be questioned”
provides additional evidence about how the Framers conceptualized the
Public Debt Clause and thus helps explain why the Framers used the word
“questioned.” The Framers were not fond of the passive voice; indeed, the
Joint Committee voted to change a passive version of what became the
second sentence of § 4 to the active voice.106 Passive sentences are useful for
authors who do not wish to restrict a verb to a particular subject. If the
Framers meant only that the United States must not question the validity of
its debts, they could have used the compact phrase, “The United States shall
not question the validity of its public debt . . . .” While the Clause surely
means at least this, it might also convey, “the validity of the public debt . . .
shall not be questioned by the people.”
The passive construction thus allows for a reading of the Clause as
containing a reassuring promise from the Framers to bondholders.
Moreover, the passive language makes the Clause more evocative than
descriptive, more like an announcement of a general principle of debt
validity than like a technical rule barring failure to make debt payments. It
would be inconsistent with this promissory announcement and with the
word “questioned” if a statute could cause bondholders to believe that their
debts will not be paid as promised and that they will need to seek redress in
the courts to recover belated payment.107
c.

The Word “Validity”

A debt does not become valid or invalid only at the moment
payment is due. A debt’s validity may be assessed at any time, and a debt is
valid only if the law provides that it will be honored.108 Therefore, a
questioned” does not imply that anyone intended the act that caused the questioning.
105A counterargument might charge that the Framers used the verb “to question” as a
restrained way of saying “to repudiate.” This is a weak counter, because its only impetus is
an assumption that the Framers must have meant to preclude only direct repudiation, the
meaning of the words of the Clause notwithstanding.
106See KENDRICK, supra note 18, at 103.
107Conceiving of the Clause as containing a promise to debtholders also problematizes a
reading of the Clause as prohibiting only congressional acts intentionally leading to
nonpayment. Debtholders would care not about whether Congress meant to place their debts
into question, but about whether they could count on receiving payment. If the Clause means
that debtholders shall have no reason to question their debts—a meaning which the passive
construction allows—then there is no reason to limit the Clause with an intentionality
requirement.
108Among the legal definitions of “valid” is “sustainable and effective in law, as
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requirement that the government not question a debt’s validity does not kick
in only once the time comes for the government to make a payment on the
debt. Rather, the duty not to question is a continuous one. If government
actions make it so that a debt will not be paid absent future governmental
action, that debt is effectively invalid.109 The intermediate level of generality
recognizes that instead of referring to payment of debts, the Clause bans
government action at any time that affects the validity of debt instruments.
The word “validity” indicates that not merely the existence of the
public debt, but also its binding force on the government “shall not be
questioned.”110 The government thus may not acknowledge that the public
debt exists but refuse to pay it. If the government fails to make a debt
payment, the debt instrument is at least temporarily invalid for legal
purposes.111 Moreover, there is no such thing as a valid debt that will
nonetheless not be honored; a debt cannot be called “valid” if existing laws
will cause default on it.112 So as soon as Congress passes a statute that will
lead to default in the absence of a change of course, the debt is invalid (or at
least of questionable validity) and Congress has violated the Public Debt
Clause.

distinguished from that which exists or took place in fact or appearance, but has not the
requisites to enable it to be recognized and enforced by law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1440 (6th ed. 1990). None of the definitions of “valid” suggests that the attribute of validity
exists only at the time of contract performance or debt payment. Therefore, government
action may constitute validity questioning not only when the government fails to make a
payment, but also when action brands a debt invalid.
109The Public Debt Clause does not distinguish debts that are invalid for all practical
purposes from debts that the law explicitly brands as invalid. The word “validity” does not
implicitly contain such a distinction, and it is not modified by the word “legal.” Reading the
distinction into the Clause would allow the government to pass one statute providing that
debts shall be legally valid, but another providing that the Treasury must not make payment
on them. This perverse definition of validity would allow an end-run around the Clause and
would defy the Framers’ intent to reassure debt-holders that their debts will be honored.
110In the absence of the words “validity of the,” the Public Debt Clause might be viewed as
establishing only a default rule. In other words, by pronouncing the legitimacy of “the public
debt,” this version of the Clause would mandate the repayment of debts, including those
incurred in suppressing rebellion, unless a future Congress specified otherwise. Such a clause
would preclude judges from holding that Congress was unauthorized to accumulate a public
debt, but would not prevent future Congresses from repudiating their obligations.
111Thus a governmental delay in paying a debt violates the Clause. If the government refuses
to make a payment on a debt at the time due but promises to make it later, the government
has not maintained the validity of the debt. Rather, the government has effectively canceled
the debt and substituted another one. While the government may well make good on its
promise, but this compensation validates the later promise, not the original one.
112A debt may become invalid regardless of whether Congress intended to make it so. The
Clause’s focus on the validity of debts rather than on congressional action thus suggests that
whether Congress intended for nonpayment to result is irrelevant.
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Evolution of the Language

The evolution of the Clause suggests that Congress’s choice of
language was not accidental. As discussed above,113 the final language of the
Clause was close to the language of an earlier proposal, but it differed in that
the phrase “validity . . . shall not be questioned” was substituted for “shall
be inviolable.” The change suggests a conscious choice of “validity . . . shall
not be questioned” over “inviolable,” which is close to “unrepudiable.”114
Why would the Framers shift to the word “questioned” if the original
language was what they actually meant? At the least, the shift suggests a
preference for phraseology that protects the public debt so strongly as to put
the government’s commitment to it beyond question. The only way to give
effect to this preference is to interpret the Clause as precluding government
action that makes default possible.
3.

Historical Evidence

Three historical factors suggest that the Framers viewed the Clause
not just as a ban on nonpayment, but rather as a more general expression of
the government’s commitment to ensuring the debt’s validity. First, as
argued above,115 imminent debt repudiation was extremely unlikely given §
3 of the Amendment, so there is no reason that the Framers would have been
more concerned with the possibility that Congress would intentionally
cancel debts than with the government’s general duty to secure payment of
its debts. Indeed, the Clause reflected the Framers’ commitment to the
sanctity of full faith and credit,116 and a purpose of the Clause was the
securing of the nation’s credit by guaranteeing payment to bondholders.117
Full investor confidence in the validity of the debt requires not just a
constitutional nonpayment ban, but also a statutory regime that provides for
payment.118
113See

supra text accompanying note 31.
difference between “inviolable” and “unrepudiable” is that the former makes clear
that a partial invalidation of debt, such as a promise to pay back a bond but without interest,
is impermissible. The phrase “the validity . . . shall not be questioned,” also appears to bar
such violation, because a partial cancellation invalidates a debt obligation and replaces it
with a lesser one.
115See supra text accompanying notes 48-55.
116See supra notes 43-47.
117See supra note 34.
118Even with constitutional protection, a statute providing for payment will boost investor
confidence. See also infra note 181. Investors are more likely to perceive the Public Debt
Clause as securing their debts if the Clause is applied to strike down statutes that would
result in default. Even if debt-holders ultimately received payment, that payment would be
delayed, the value of the debts would likely decline because of the initial repudiation, and the
debt-holders would suffer litigation risk. In addition, if Congress were to engage in a course
of action that would make it impossible (either practically or mathematically) for a successor
114The
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Second, participants in the ratification debate did not conceptualize
the Clause as being only a technical ban on the failure of the government to
make debt payments. Both proponents and opponents of the Clause agreed
that it precluded taxation of income from outstanding bonds.119 Such
taxation would not trigger the intermediate level of generality, which bans
only nonpayment, not actions occurring before or after scheduled payment
that lower the value of debt.120 The debate suggests that the Clause was
viewed as a general principle requiring the government to ensure the full
and unconditional validity of debts.
Third, just a month before the final debate on the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress passed a statute converting the bulk of bond
payments into a permanent appropriation.121 Thus, instead of leaving
bondholders to the whims of future Congresses or the courts, Congress
sought to place the public debt above the fray.122 Accepting the intermediate
level of generality would mean that Congress could repeal this statute and
substitute an annual appropriation. It would be odd if a constitutional
limitation and a statute pursued the same goal of protecting government
debt, but the constitutional provision would tolerate repeal of the statute and
thus subversion of the goal.
4.

Identifying Debt Questionings

While a repudiation rule offers the advantage of a simple
enforcement test, it is also possible to create administrable tests for a
prohibition on a broader class of debt questionings. A fact-finder could
assess purported breaches of the Clause using either an objective or a
subjective standard.123 The objective standard inquires into whether a
Congress to honor all of its debts, then the constitutional provision probably wouldn’t work.
The Supreme Court might refuse to apply the Public Debt Clause, or it might be repealed
through Article V amendment.
119See, e.g., JOSEPH B. JAMES, THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18, 224
(1984).
120The high level of generality probably does ban taxation of government bonds, at least at
rates higher than those existing at the time of the bonds’ purchase. A tax jeopardizes debts by
providing that they will not be honored in full unless Congress repeals the tax after payment.
However, the Sixteenth Amendment’s allowance of income taxes arguably trumps the Public
Debt Clause’s prohibition of excess bond taxation.
121See supra note 54. Routine appropriations were made on an annual basis. See, e.g., Act of
Apr. 6, 1866, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 14 (providing miscellaneous appropriations).
122The statute may also reflect administrative simplicity, since Congress could know in
advance when bonds would become due. However, in no meaningful sense is it more
difficult for the government to budget expected payments during each budget cycle rather
than in advance. What makes a permanent appropriation unique is that money will be spent
unless Congress affirmatively repeals it. See, e.g., Charles Tiefer, “Budgetized” Health
Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in Congress’s 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 411, 415–16 (1996) (contrasting annual and permanent appropriations).
123This section uses the terms “objective” and “subjective” to refer to whether a test
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governmental action in fact jeopardized debt, while the subjective standard
asks whether holders of the public debt are genuinely concerned about the
validity of their debts. These standards can be translated into bright-line
rules. For example, a bright-line test of the objective standard might be
whether the United States would meet its debt obligations if Congress never
passed another statute (or passed only statutes adhering to long-term budget
projections).124 Similarly, with bond debt, a bright-line test of the subjective
standard might be whether any rating service had downgraded the debt.125
While it might seem odd for a constitutional test to depend on the actions of
private agencies, this approach makes sense if the test’s aim is to dermine
whether debtholders are genuinely considered about government action. Just
because the objective and subjective standards may be translated into these
bright-line tests does not necessarily mean that these are the only possible
tests.126 The point is that it need not be difficult to apply a test once
selected,127 even if it is difficult to pick a test from among those possible.128
It is impossible to prove that the bright-line objective and subjective
tests sketched above are the best tests or that one is better than the other.
However, there are practical reasons to prefer these tests over others, and to
prefer the objective over the subjective. An advantage of both tests is that
although they take the word “questioned” seriously, they do not turn the
word into a hair-trigger. A wide range of governmental actions presumably
has marginal effects on both the probability of default and concern about the
considers debtholders’ state of mind, not to whether a test may be administered without bias.
124For example, if Congress repealed a statute providing for repayment of a debt not yet due,
thus leaving it to the discretion of a future Congress whether to honor the debt, the repeal
would violate the objective test. See also supra note 96.
125Bright-line subjective tests for non-bond debt are more difficult, but not impossible, to
develop. For example, a bright-line test of the solidity of government pensions might find a
debt questioning if a given percentage of government employees began to purchase private
insurance against the possibility of decreased payments.
126For example, an alternative test for the objective standard, also bright-line, would consider
a warning by a ratings service to constitute a debt questioning. The subjective standard could
be assessed using a multi-factorial test, in which a judicial fact-finder might consider bond
ratings, stock and bond prices, statistical studies, newspaper commentary, and testimony by
debt-holders. Or a court might create a balancing test that allowed limited questionings
where the government had substantial or compelling interests.
127Even if the best test required a judge to make an intuitive finding about whether a debt
questioning had occurred, such a judgment might still be superior to a rule narrowing debt
questioning to repudiation. Judicial tests for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as
the intermediate scrutiny Equal Protection Clause test for quasi-suspect classifications, are
often difficult to apply but are applied nonetheless. See, e.g., Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 742-44 (Powell, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with Court’s
conclusion under intermediate-scrutiny test).
128The difficulty in picking appropriate tests has, of course, not led the courts to assume that
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment should be applied as narrowly as possible.
Rather, the judiciary actively debates what are appropriate tests for violation, for example, of
the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., id. at 724 n.9 (O’Connor, J.) (confronting objections to
intermediate-scrutiny test).
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possibility of such default, but to conclude that all of these actions violate
the Clause would stifle too much activity.129 Just because “questioned” is
roughly synonymous with “jeopardized” does not provide a textual
argument that any statute increasing the probability of repudiation even
marginally should be held to constitute a debt questioning. Just because this
Article has concluded that “to question” most closely means “to jeopardize”
does not mean that it must conclude that “to question” means “to jeopardize
even just a little bit.” “To question” might also mean “to jeopardize
somewhat” or “to jeopardize a lot”.
Because nothing in the phrase “shall not be questioned” indicates to
what degree jeopardization must occur before it will constitute a
questioning, it makes sense for tests of questioning to take a balanced
approach. On the one hand, a test should not brand as unconstitutional
government actions that have very small effects on debt accumulation, but
that Tests can recognize this by identifying only substantial increases in the
probability of repudiation or in debt-holders’ concern about it. The objective
test accordingly finds a questioning only when the existing statutory scheme
would in fact lead to default in the absence of further congressional action.
Similarly, the subjective test triggers the Clause only when a bond agency
lowers the rating of U.S. debt because its riskiness passes a substantial
threshold.130
The objective and subjective tests reflect different purposes of the
Clause and the different plausible subjects of the past participle
“questioned.” Essentially, the objective test identifies a questioning by the
government and thus is compatible with an interpretation of the Clause as
banning any congressional or judicial action making a debt’s repayment
uncertain. The subjective test reflects the reassurance component of the
Clause and asks whether the people have genuine concerns about the
government’s actions. The objective standard may therefore be preferable,
because the Clause achieves its goal of reassuring debt-holders through its
central mechanism, a limit on governmental action.131
129For example, any increase in debt presumably raises the probability that the government
will be unable to meet existing debts. But a rule preventing the government from issuing any
new debts would clearly sweep too far and, indeed, defeat a purpose of the Public Debt
Clause, the securitization of the nation’s debt issuance.
130Relying on bond ratings rather than bond prices is essential. If the test targeted a decline
in bond prices, it would inappropriately assume that investor jitters were a proxy for the
probability of default. Bond prices reflect not only the probability of default but also changes
in the time value of money and the availability of alternative investments. Bond ratings,
however, reflect only those jitters caused by perceptions of an increased probability of
default.
131However, one could argue that either test alone or both tests together should identify a
debt questioning for the Clause to be triggered. If the Public Debt Clause is seen as
protecting against only those governmental actions threatening repudiation and worrying
debt-holders, then both tests should be necessary conditions for triggering the Clause. In
contrast, if the Clause is seen as protecting against only the possibility of repudiation or
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Outer Reaches of the Clause’s Meaning

In sum, reading the Public Debt Clause literally leads to a
construction of the Clause that is broad in two senses. First, the “public
debt” includes statutorily authorized congressional budgetary promises
besides financial bond instruments. Second, governmental actions short of
direct repudiation may trigger the Clause if they endanger the validity of
debts. This broad construction may not be the only plausible interpretation
of the Clause; the Framers might have intended something much narrower
but drafted the provision carelessly. The point is, however, that a broad
judicial construction of the Clause would not be tantamount to implicit
constitutional amendment in defiance of an obvious limited meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s words. Rather, such a broad construction would
reflect a literal and sensible interpretation of the Clause’s words.
This Article’s interpretation of the Public Debt Clause hardly
exhausts questions about the Clause’s substantive limits.132 For example,
does the Clause encompass debts that the government incurs through
compulsion, or only those in which the government’s promise serves as an
incentive in the open market for assumption of government debts?133 May
Congress make a promise that would ordinarily become part of the public
debt, but reserve to itself the right to change or renege on its promise?134
Does the Public Debt Clause encompass all debts, or only those that the
Congress explicitly makes on the credit of the United States or pursuant to
the Clause itself?135
against only concern about repudiation, then the single appropriate test should be sufficient.
132Equally difficult are questions about the Clause’s procedural limits; what happens when
Congress appears to violate the Public Debt Clause? Some of these questions are addressed
in Part IV, infra, which asks to what extent constitutional infirmities in budget processes and
policies are justiciable.
133For example, one might argue that if the government were to require all Americans to buy
$500 bonds, those bonds would not implicate the Public Debt Clause. Because the
government could have simply compelled purchase without exchanging a promise, it has not
taken advantage of the credibility that the Public Debt Clause provides. This argument,
however, may at odds with a central purpose of the Clause: assuring the public that
greenbacks, which the Legal Tender Acts forced on government contractors, would remain
valid. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46. On the other hand, government contractors
retained the option of leaving the market altogether.
134Suppose, for example, that the Congress issued bonds with a maturity value of $500, but
provided in the bonds’ terms that Congress shall pay on maturity $500, or such other amount
as it might subsequently decree by law. Although the bondholder recognizes ex ante that the
bond’s value is subject to Congressional discretion, one might argue that the Public Debt
Clause precludes the government from issuing non-full faith debt or, more generally,
reserving to itself the right to renege on its promises. On the other hand, if one accepts the
principle that the government may reserve to itself the unilateral right to modify promises,
one might further argue that such a reservation is inherent in the legislative power itself.
135A rule that Congress incurs a debt only by specific reference to the Clause would be
tantamount to a default rule treating Congressional promises as retractable. Such a default
rule might be a sensible bright-line rule if recipients of governmental promises ordinarily
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These questions are difficult both interpretively and normatively.
Nothing in the history or language of the Clause indicates to what extent
Congress may control whether a given transaction implicates the Clause.
Allowing Congress to withhold full-faith status from obligations seems
counter to the nature of a constitutional provision limiting congressional
power and discretion. On the other hand, robotically tossing all
congressional promises into the public debt leaves open the possibility that
Congress might use the Public Debt Clause as a constitutional trick to
impose its substantive budgetary preferences on future Congresses. There
are sensible middle-ground positions; for example, the Clause might be
interpreted as binding whenever Congress makes an unqualified promise
and could reasonably have believed that binding itself would be beneficial.
This Article assumes that the courts could place appropriate limits on the
Public Debt Clause,136 and Part II attempts to distinguish situations in which
the Clause’s applicability depends on the broad construction that this
Section defends or on particular additional assumptions about the Clause’s
limits.
III.

Applications of the Public Debt Clause

This Part describes how application of the Public Debt Clause could
reform congressional budget process problems that threaten fiscal disaster
along various time horizons. Section III.A shows how the Clause could limit
the destructive potential of budget impasses in the short term. Turning to
long-term problems, Section III.B explains how the Clause could diminish
accumulation of debts, while Section III.C assesses whether the Clause
protects the entitlements that contribute to the debt. This organization also
tracks movement from budgetary issues that the Clause almost certainly
affects to areas in which the Clause’s relevance is less certain.
A.

Train Wrecks

Congressional budget impasses introduce the specter of “train
wrecks.”137 The metaphor goes like this: When Congress and the President
fail to agree on a budget by the beginning of the fiscal year, the previously
realize that the government is likely to renege. The counterargument, of course, would be
that the point of the Public Debt Clause is to instill confidence in the reliability of
government promises.
136Any jurisprudential rules limiting the Clause’s applicability would need to clarify first,
how unequivocally Congress must act in making a promise for it to become part of the public
debt, and second, what showing Congress must make to establish that the promise reflects a
genuine debt rather than a substantive value preference. The broadest possible interpretation
of the Clause would place any congressional promise into the debt without examining
Congress’s motives.
137See Michael Wines, The Budget: A Train Wreck?, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 22.
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smooth-running government train begins to derail, with non-essential
services138 pushed along only if Congress and the President can agree on
“continuing resolutions.”139 The train continues to edge forward until the
government both runs out of cash and reaches the federal limit on
borrowing. Then, the government train crashes and stops, a wreck that only
a subsequent infusion of cash or a suspension of the debt limit can budge.
No budget impasse has ever led to a train wreck, but it has come
close, most recently and precariously at the start of the 1996 fiscal year,140
when the inability of Congress and the President to agree on a budget or a
debt-limit increase threatened default.141 The government shut down nonessential services, but temporary waivers of the federal debt limit142 and
accounting tricks by the Treasury143 kept the government from reaching the
limit.144 Although the Congressional Budget Office has recommended
abolition of the federal debt limit,145 Congress has not responded. The
138Non-essential

services are those not “involving the safety of human life or the protection
of property.” 13 U.S.C. § 1342 (1996).
139See, e.g., Act of Nov. 20, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-56, 109 Stat. 548 (allowing temporary
funding of some federal government programs).
140An earlier debt-ceiling crisis occurred in 1985. See, e.g., Alan Murray, Treasury Says U.S.
Will Default Friday Without Debt Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 1985, at A1.
141See, e.g., Leon Hadar, US Default on Debt? Oh Yes, It Can Happen, BUSINESS TIMES, Jan.
19, 1996, at 10; Alan Murray, Debt-Limit Crisis Is Not Over Yet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1995,
at A1.
142See, e.g., Act of Feb. 8, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-103, 110 Stat. 55 (exempting amount
equivalent to one month of Social Security payments from being counted toward debt
ceiling); Act of March 12, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-115, 110 Stat. 825.(exempting government
trust fund investments and reinvestments from debt ceiling).
143Treasury Secretary Rubin took advantage of statutory changes passed in the wake of the
1985 debt-ceiling crisis designed to help avert default. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, Title VI, sec. 6002(a)-(c), 100 Stat. 1874, 1931. The
changes authorized him to redirect investments in pensions funds, 5 U.S.C. § 8348(j)(1)
(1996), and “to sell or redeem securities, obligations, or other invested assets of the Fund
before maturity in order to prevent the public debt of the United States from exceeding the
public debt limit,” § 8348(k)(1). The Secretary may take these actions only during a “debt
issuance suspension period,” defined in § 8348(j)(5)(B) as “any period for which the
Secretary of the Treasury determines . . . that the issuance of obligations of the United States
may not be made without exceeding the public debt limit.” The General Accounting Office
later determined that the Treasury’s actions were authorized by the statute. See GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEBT CEILING--ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS DURING THE 1995-1996 CRISIS
(1996); Clay Chandler, GAO Says Rubin Tapped Retirement Funds Legally, WASH. POST,
Sept. 7, 1996, at D2. Republicans have charged, however, that Secretary Rubin exceeded his
legal authority. See NICK SMITH, REPORT OF THE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON THE DEBT LIMIT AND
MISUSE OF THE TRUST FUNDS (1996) (questioning Secretary’s authority to declare debt
issuance suspension period); Constitutional Debt Crisis, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 12,
1996, at 15C (noting statements of former Attorneys General and Treasury Secretaries
warning of illegality of Treasury Secretary Rubin’s plans).
144See Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, sec. 301, 110
Stat. 847 (resolving crisis by raising debt ceiling).
145See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE
48, 54 (1995). The General Accounting Office has long favored elimination of the statutory
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possibility of a future train wreck thus raises two questions: First, is it
constitutional under the Public Debt Clause for the government to stop
payments on bonds and other obligations? And second, is the debt-limit
statute that makes a train wreck possible itself constitutional?
1.

Governmental Failure to Make Payments on Bonds

If the debt were to reach the statutory ceiling,146 the Treasury might
fail to make a required interest payments on its bonds.147 Such a failure
would transcend mere questioning of the public debt’s validity; it would
constitute partial invalidation of the public debt, because the Treasury
commits in its regulations to make interest payments at certain times.148
Such partial invalidation runs afoul of the Public Debt Clause for two
reasons.149 First, a “partial-faith-and-credit” principle would allow the
government to liquidate its debts for nominal consideration and convert the
Clause into a virtual nullity. Second, a delay in payment calls into question
the government’s commitment to pay the remainder of a debt and its
commitment to pay other debts, thus violating the proviso that the debt’s
validity “not be questioned.”150
Assuming that the government must pay damages for a breach of
the Public Debt Clause, what is the measure of damages?151 Because bond
debt limit. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, A NEW APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC DEBT
LEGISLATION SHOULD BE CONSIDERED (1979). Bills accomplishing a repeal were considered
in the last Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 215, 104th Cong. (1995).
146The debt limit is set in 31 U.S.C.A. § 3101 (Westlaw 1996), which currently provides that
“[t]he face amount of obligations . . . whose principal and interest are guaranteed by the
United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of the
Treasury) may not be more than $5,500,000,000,000 outstanding at any one time . . . .” For a
comprehensive history of § 3101, see DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1996, HISTORICAL TABLES 92-94 (1995)
[hereinafter HISTORICAL TABLES].
147The United States has failed to make timely payments before, most recently in 1979, when
despite the resolution of a debt-limit crisis, administrative snafus at the Treasury Department
led to delayed payments on some bond issues. See James J. Angel, Looking Back at Debt
Defaults in U.S. History, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1996, at 21 (arguing that default “would have
serious consequences, but . . . would not be the end of the world”).
148See 31 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(5) (1996) (authorizing Treasury to specify dates on which it will
pay bonds’ principal and interest).
149At least two newspaper editorials have suggested that default on the debt would be
unconstitutional. See Steve Charnovitz, Extortion and the Debt Ceiling, J. COMMERCE, Nov.
16, 1995, at 10A; George B. Tindall, Is This Train Wreck Constitutional?, NEWS &
OBSERVER (RALEIGH), Nov. 15, 1995, at A25.
150Even the possibility of a partial repudiation caused investors to lose some faith in U.S.
bonds. See David E. Sanger, S.&P. Strongly Warns U.S. on the Danger of Default, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 1995, at 37 (reporting that faith of investors in government debt had been
diminished, despite Standard & Poor’s decision not to lower United States’s AAA credit
rating).
151Just because the United States would presumably need to pay damages for failing to honor
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markets are highly competitive, a bondholder presumably could have
purchased a perfect substitute for a U.S. bond, so the bondholder’s damages
are the same using either an expectancy or a reliance formulation.152 Under
either scheme, the government would owe not just the missed interest
payment, but also interest on that payment that would have accumulated
during litigation. Even these damages might not fully compensate
bondholders, however, since the debt repudiation would hurt the United
States’s credit rating and thus lower the value of outstanding bonds.153
2.

Non-Bond Obligations Within the Public Debt

The government’s reaching the debt ceiling would stop not just
interest payments on bonds, but also other government obligations. Unless
the Public Debt Clause applies only to debts explicitly made on the credit of
the United States, ceasing payments for some of these obligations would
also raise constitutional questions. Indeed, such a cessation would be
problematic not only if it occurred because of a debt-ceiling crash, but also
if Congress and the President failed to reach a budget agreement and the
government shut down, as in 1995-96.
Determining which government payments are discretionary and
which are required under the Public Debt Clause may be difficult in some
instances, but some ordinary government expenditures fit squarely within
the broad construction of the public debt defended in Part II. For example,
a debt does not mean that it is constitutional for the United States not to honor a debt, as long
as it pays later. In other words, there is no reason to import into the Public Debt Clause the
limited, Holmesian view of contractual obligation: “The only universal consequence of a
legally binding promise is, that the law makes the promisor pay damages if the promised
event does not come to pass.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 301 (1881).
The Public Debt Clause changes the promisor’s ordinary choice by requiring the United
States to meet its fiscal commitments. For the Clause to have any enforceability, the courts
will need to be able to impose damages if the United States fails in its constitutional duty, but
this does not mean that the government has taken a constitutionally permissible step by
failing to make a debt payment. Nonetheless, there is something anomalous about enforcing a
constitutional requirement that the government keep promises by allowing the government to
break promises and then pay damages. The cure in the case of the budget impasses is for the
courts to strike down the debt-limit statute that makes default possible, as explained below.
152See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:
Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 225 n.20 (1987) (noting
conditions for merger of expectancy and reliance damages).
153Computing such damages would be difficult, because a court decision reimbursing a
bondholder would reinstill confidence in U.S. bonds and cause them to appreciate. It is
possible that the bonds would rise to even greater than their initial value, since such a
decision could reassure bondholders about the vitality of the Public Debt Clause and make
uncompensated repudiation seem even less likely than initially. On the other hand,
bondholders might not have confidence in the precedential value of the court decision, and
the willingness of the government to default might overshadow the willingness of the court to
order compensation. In addition, any uncompensated litigation costs incurred in defending
bonds adds to the cost of their ownership.
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government civil-service pension payments and money owed to independent
contractors represent unambiguous obligations that the government owes
because of past agreements in which the debt-holders have already fulfilled
their part of the bargains.
There are gray areas in which recipients of government money have
an expectation of continued receipt but in which there may or may not be an
agreement triggering the Public Debt Clause. If the Public Debt Clause
applies to obligations that the government requires individuals to purchase, a
budget crisis might not relieve the government of its duty to issue Social
Security checks, since it has promised to make payments from a trust fund
accumulated in part through recipients’ own contributions.154 A failure by
the government to make a payment because of a train wreck would breach a
statutorily established agreement that the government will provide
beneficiaries means of subsistence in exchange for their earlier
contributions.155 Medicare is less likely to qualify as a government
agreement with beneficiaries, because there is less of a nexus between an
individual’s contributions and benefits than in the case of Social Security.156
Similarly, current government employees expect to be paid, but they
are subject to dismissal,157 and the annual budget process serves as an
implicit annual review of which employees’ contracts to renew. Whether the
government would need to make salary payments depends on whether the
government incurs a public debt when it hires an employee or when the
employee has actually performed contracted-for duties. This hinges in turn
on whether the government is considered to have formed agreements of
continued employment with its employees.
3.

The Federal Debt-Limit Statute

Regardless of which governmental obligations are part of the public
debt and thus unconstitutional to repudiate, the federal debt-limit statute
makes train wrecks and thus repudiation possible. Although the debt-limit
statute is theoretically written in pursuance of the goals of the Public Debt
154See

Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 622 (principally codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1996)).
155The counterargument is that the government has not entered into agreements with
beneficiaries, but rather has established a statutory scheme that it can change. See infra
Section III.C. Even if the government has reserved the right to alter Social Security in
general, however, a beneficiary might claim that the government must continue to make
payments until it changes the statutory scheme to discontinue them.
156Medicare is a hybrid system. Part A of Medicare, providing hospital insurance, is funded
like Social Security, through a special payroll tax that accumulates in a trust fund. Part B,
offering supplemental medical insurance, is funded primarily through general tax revenues.
See, e.g., Tiefer, supra note 122, at 417.
157Cf. Crenshew v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) (holding that government employee
has no contractual right against termination by Congress on public-policy grounds).
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Clause,158 it works counter to the Clause’s goals. The statute precludes
government borrowing above a level that Congress has set, even if that
borrowing is needed to meet expenses required to maintain the public debt’s
validity. The statute thus works at cross-purposes, serving both as a
legitimate exercise of federal power under the Public Debt Clause159 and as
a potential cause of unconstitutional debt repudiation. Whether the statute in
fact increases or decreases the probability of default or investor confidence
is therefore impossible to determine a priori.160 Under the objective and
subjective tests for debt repudiation defended above,161 however, it is not
necessary to weigh these effects speculatively,162 and the statute flunks at
least the objective test and possibly the subjective test also.
The Public Debt Clause promises bondholders not just that bonds
will remain valid, but that their validity will not be questioned.163 The debt
limit will necessarily lead to the repudiation of governmental obligations in
the absence of congressional action, as the statutory scheme leaves open to
question whether a later Congress will honor the public debt by changing
the laws. The debt ceiling thus fails the objective test for debt questioning.
Even if the Clause allowed one Congress to count on a future Congress to
pay required debts, the debt limit statute is still suspect, because in the
absence of the statute, repayment would necessarily occur.164 The debt limit
thus takes an affirmative step toward repudiation and places into question
Congress’s commitment elsewhere expressed to pay the debt.
In addition, the statute functionally has allowed Congress to play
chicken in Washington fiscal negotiations;165 Congress runs the budget train
158Indeed,

the drafters of the proposed Balanced Budget Amendment effectively sought to
constitutionalize the debt-limit statute by requiring a three-fifths majority of both Houses to
raise the debt limit. See S.J. Res. 1, § 2 (1995). But see Seto, supra note 10, at 1516–19
(criticizing this enforcement mechanism).
159Combining Sections 4 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to
legislate to ensure the validity of the public debt. See also infra Subsection III.B.2.
160The empirical question is whether the statute, by reflecting a congressional commitment
not to let the debt rise above a certain level, inspires confidence in U.S. bonds that makes up
for the chance of repudiation in the event of a train wreck. Because the debt limit has so far
failed to stem long-term debt growth but has come close to bringing a train wreck, it seems
intuitively likely that the statute decreases confidence.
161See supra Subsection II.B.4.
162That the tests do not require such a weighing makes sense in this context for two reasons.
First, the tests are bright-line rules and thus designed not to entail abstract balancing. Second,
Congress could exempt payments on the debt from the statute and thus preserve its debtensuring effects.
163See supra Section II.B. Under this Article’s interpretation of “validity . . . shall not be
questioned,” the debt-limit statute may be attacked on its face and not merely only when it
leads to repudiation of a debt in a particular circumstance.
164Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3123(a) (pledging faith of United States in paying its bond obligations).
165See, e.g., Adam Clymer, G.O.P. Lawmakers Offer to Abandon Debt-Limit Threat, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at A1 (describing Republicans’ offer to raise debt limit in exchange for
“down payment” on balanced budget).
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directly toward the debt limit, hoping to force the President to make the turn
that Congress prefers.166 If this abuse of the public-debt statute causes
bondholders to question the validity of their debts, the Clause might be
breached under a subjective test of its meaning,167 even if no default occurs.
In addition, this abuse of the debt-limit statute militates against a conclusion
that Congress’s intent in the statue is genuinely to protect the validity of the
debt.
As long as tax receipts are greater than public debt payments, a
prioritization of public debt payments over other expenses could harmonize
a debt-limit statute with the Public Debt Clause. The statutory scheme does
not currently allow for such preferential treatment; the Treasury pays
obligations on a rolling basis.168 When the public-debt ceiling has been
reached, the Treasury makes a payment only if it has sufficient
governmental receipts to do so. Government receipts arrive sporadically
throughout the tax year,169 and a lump sum of receipts might be depleted by
non-public debt expenses just before a debt payment becomes due.
Therefore even with a budget in balance or surplus, the government might
temporarily hit the debt ceiling in the middle of the year and fail to make
needed expenses. It is theoretically possible that the timing of receipts and
expenses would work out such that this would not occur, but nothing in
federal budget practice guarantees this.
A debt-limit statute aimed only at ensuring the validity of the public
debt would exempt borrowing for payments on the debt. In the absence of
such amendment, it is difficult to imagine a modification, either judicially or
congressionally imposed, that could save the debt-limit statute’s
constitutionality. A statute might allow the Treasury Secretary to anticipate
the possibility of a debt-ceiling crisis and stop non-debt expenses to save for
impending debt payments. The Treasury Secretary, however, might fail to
anticipate a debt-ceiling crisis170 or might underestimate its duration. Thus,
166In

theory, the game might flip, with the executive branch refusing to approve an increase
in the public debt limit unless the legislative branch caves in to budget demands. Congress,
however, has rigged the game by providing in 31 U.S.C. § 3101 that the House can
unilaterally raise the debt ceiling as necessary under its House Rule XLIX, also known as the
Gephardt Rule. This rigging further undermines the claim that the debt ceiling’s goal is to
preserve the validity of the debt.
167See supra text accompanying note 125. Under the subjective test proposed, the Clause
would not have been breached since the debt was not downgraded. However, under a
different formulation of the test, for example considering any investor skittishness sufficient
to trigger the Clause, the Clause might have been violated.
168Under 31 U.S.C. § 3102 (1996), the Treasury Secretary may issue bonds to cover
expenses as they become due.
169In December, 1995, for example, a sudden infusion of quarterly estimated tax payments
helped keep the government briefly afloat. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note
143, at 24-25.
170Indeed, existing law already gives the Secretary authority to declare a debt issuance
suspension period and take certain defensive actions. See supra note 143. But like politics
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unless the Secretary ultimately has the authority to borrow to make
payments on the public debt, the debt-limit statute leaves open the
possibility of default and violates the Public Debt Clause.
B.

Deficits and Debt

To read the Public Debt Clause as requiring a balanced budget
would be a remarkable feat of interpretive legerdemain. After all, the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment had just accumulated massive
deficits and certainly were not promising never to do so again. Additionally,
economists agree that a budget deficit of zero is a convenient but arbitrary
target,171 so it can hardly be read into the Public Debt Clause’s text.
However, just because the Clause is not a Balanced Budget Amendment in
disguise does not mean that it cannot serve as a substitute for such an
amendment. If the accumulation of deficits makes questionable the
government’s ability to meet existing debt obligations, then the Clause may
be triggered.
1.

Unsustainable Debt Accumulation

The U.S. debt today is relatively small,172 and American bonds are
considered among the “world’s safest investments.”173 Economists warn,
however, that if the United States fails to increase taxes or reduce spending,
the debt will spiral to unprecedented levels.174 Indeed, without change, the
debt would increase faster than the growth of the economy itself.
Economists define such growth as unsustainable,175 since if it remained
unchecked, payments on the debt would ultimately consume the nation’s
entire economic output. Of course, at some point Stein’s Law will become

generally, debt-ceiling crises can be unpredictable.
171See, e.g., WILLIAM R. KEECH, ECONOMIC POLITICS 123 (1995) (“A nominal balance of the
government’s revenues and expenditures is a thoroughly arbitrary target, although it is very
appealing politically because it is simpler than any other target and thus is more widely
understood among voters.”).
172The debt held by the public at the end of fiscal year 1996 is projected at 52.1% of GDP; in
other words, the debt is only about half one-year’s national income. See HISTORICAL TABLES,
supra note 146, at 90. The United States’s structural budget deficit is smaller than that of all
but two other OECD industrialized countries. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra
note 5, at 90. For a review of the causes of large debts in OECD countries, see ALBERTO
ALESINA & ROBERTO PEROTTI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BUDGET DEFICITS (International
Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/94/85, Aug. 1994).
173See, e.g., Financial Markets, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1996, at D3 (noting that U.S. bonds
retain highest possible ratings).
174The Congressional Budget Office projects that under current policies, the debt-to-GDP
ratio will climb to 311% by 2050. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 5, at 77.
175See id. at xxiii (“For a path of spending and revenues to be sustainable, the resulting debt
must eventually grow no faster than the economy.”).
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operative: “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.”176 The question
is whether it will stop before a crisis of confidence in U.S. debt, after such a
crisis but before repudiation, or after national insolvency.177 Most of the
United States’s debt is internally held,178 so a political constituency would
oppose any effort at debt repudiation. If this Article is correct, such an effort
would require a constitutional amendment,179 so even a minority might
thwart it. But some have credited massive debt levels with bringing about
the French and Russian Revolutions,180 and a true debt crisis could force the
government to cut social services and bring unpredictable unrest.
The Public Debt Clause’s “shall not be questioned” language allows
the courts to intervene before debt repudiation becomes a viable option.181
The quandary, however, is in the line-drawing. Whenever the United States
runs a deficit, it moves closer to an unmanageable debt level, but applying a
hair-trigger test to debt accumulation would inflate the Public Debt Clause
into a full-scale Balanced Budget Amendment. But if this approach would
apply the Clause too soon, then waiting for debt repudiation applies it too
late.
Both the objective and subjective tests of debt questioning182
provide ways to apply the Clause in between these extremes. The subjective
standard would be triggered when debt accumulation becomes so excessive
that bond rating agencies downgrade U.S. debt. The objective standard
would preclude any budget that would cause the debt to cross the economic
176See,

e.g., Herbert Stein, Leave the Trade Deficit Alone, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 1987, at
A20.
177In a technical sense, governments cannot go bankrupt, since bankruptcy proceedings do
not apply to the federal government. Moreover, the government can always whittle the debt
down through inflation, except to the extent the debt is held in inflation-indexed bonds. See
John R. Wilke, Treasury Plans to Sell Inflation-Indexed Bonds, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1996,
at C1 (noting first planned Treasury issue of bonds protected against inflation).
178Approximately 20 percent of the national debt is held by foreigners. See ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 82, at 195-96.
179One could argue that the Public Debt Clause is unrepealable. If repeal were proposed in a
national crisis, the debt would unconstitutionally be in question after repeal seemed viable
but before ratification by the states. However, Article V’s strong presumption of
amendability probably means the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to
make an exception to Article V.
180See Seto, supra note 10, at 1459 & nn.24–25.
181This suggests a paradox: If the Supreme Court held debt accumulation to constitute a
questioning, then presumably it would also hold repudiation illegal, but that precedent would
mean that debt accumulation could not constitutionally lead to repudiation, and thus the
accumulation ought not constitute a questioning. A resolution to this paradox views the
government’s actions independent of the Public Debt Clause’s constitutional restraint. This is
the only way to honor the Clause’s “shall not be questioned” language. Moreover, Article V
permits repeal of constitutional provisions, so fiscal unsustainability puts into question the
validity of the public debt by making repeal seem like a viable option. Even without Article
V, the Supreme Court might in a national crisis overrule precedent and allow debt
repudiation.
182See supra Subsection II.B.4.
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threshold of unsustainability.183 A deficit hawk might seek earlier
application of the objective test by noting that the statutory scheme places
the economy on the way to unsustainability. Such an anticipatory thrust is
two levels removed from actual default, but there is no compelling
counterargument to this expansive interpretation of “shall not be
questioned.”184 In addition, it makes normative sense to deal with problems
sooner rather than later,185 and it therefore might be healthy for the courts to
ask Congress to clarify its long-term goals.
2.

Legislation Forcing Deficit Reduction

Although Congress just missed the supermajority needed to pass the
Balanced Budget Amendment,186 congressional support for a scheme that
would tie Congress’s hands and force budget balance has long been strong.
Indeed, with the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985,187 popularly known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, Congress attempted
to create a statutory regime that would force budget balance by requiring the
Comptroller General to implement an across-the-board cut, known as a
sequestration, of non-entitlement expenditures to achieve balance if
Congress failed to reach balance on its own.188 Although the Supreme Court
found the Comptroller General’s role in this scheme unconstitutional in
Bowsher v. Synar,189 Congress cured the statute’s constitutional
infirmities.190 Deficits continued to climb, however, as Congress and the
Office of Management and Budget took advantage of accounting

183Application

of such a standard would require a determination of whether interest
payments on the debt are increasing at a faster rate than the economy will grow. Predictions
of economic growth are uncertain, but given governmental economic statistics, this standard
should be easy to apply. The statistics might in fact be inaccurate, but by mapping an
isomorphism from the unquestionable validity of the public debt to its sustainability, the
standard allows for dispassionate, bright-line assessment.
184Whether a budget on the path to unsustainability fails the objective test depends on
whether the test asks what would happen if Congress passes no further statutes or what
would happen if Congress sticks to its long-term plans.
185See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING AND
REVENUE OPTIONS 450 (1996) (arguing for addressing spending growth before retirement of
baby boomers).
186See supra note 10.
187Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42
U.S.C.).
188See generally Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-RudmanHollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988).
189478 U.S. 714 (1986). The Court held that because Congress reserved the right to remove
the Comptroller General, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings violated separations-of-powers
principles by giving Congress a role in the execution of the laws. Id. at 736.
190See The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-119, tit. I-II, 101 Stat. 754 (1987).
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loopholes,191 and ultimately Congress gave up on the Gramm-RudmanHollings approach altogether, replacing it with the Budget Enforcement Act
of 1990,192 which relied mostly on voluntary congressional compliance with
deficit targets. In the end, Congress was unable to resist the lure of deficit
spending.
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings failed because of the general rule that
later legislative enactments are given priority over earlier ones.193 But later
statutes may not unconstitutionally repeal earlier ones, and the Public Debt
Clause may make it unconstitutional for Congress to deviate from a course
adopted pursuant to the Public Debt Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.194 If Congress explicitly creates a scheme to secure the validity
of the public debt, and a subsequent Congress overturns that scheme, such a
reversal might constitute a “questioning” of the validity of the debt.
This argument would be strongest for a statute explicitly invoking
Sections 4 and 5 and providing that it may be amended only if the
modification would not constitute a debt questioning.195 A court scrutinizing
an amendment to or a repeal of such legislation would then apply an
incarnation of either the subjective or the objective test of debt
questioning.196 As usual, the subjective test would consider whether the
change undercut the bond markets’ faith in government debt. The alternative
objective test would assess whether the change would cause unsustainable
debt growth or, using a broader version of the test, would put the
government on the path to such unconstitutional growth.

191For a description of these loopholes, as well as of the failure of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
and the adoption of the Budget Enforcement Act, see Joyce & Reischauer, supra note 9, at
433-40.
192Pub. L. No. 101-508, tit. XIII, 104 Stat. 1388 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901922 (1996)).
193See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Corning, 179 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that later budgets
override inconsistencies with earlier ones).
194Section 5 provides that “Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.”
195Even a court that would not have found the abandonment of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
unconstitutional might be wary if Congress had earlier limited a debt-reduction statute’s
amendability. Congress’s power under § 5 to enforce the values of the Public Debt Clause
probably extends beyond the courts’ power to enforce the Clause’s letter. Although
Congress has never taken explicit advantage of § 5 in the context of the Public Debt Clause,
the Supreme Court has interpreted § 5 broadly in the context of the Equal Protection Clause.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Court applied a rational-basis test to
determine whether congressional action reflected the Fourteenth Amendment’s goals. The
Court thus upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965’s nullification of an English literacy
requirement even though such a requirement was not itself unconstitutional. Similarly, even
if abandonment of a debt-reduction scheme would not ordinarily be unconstitutional, the
Court might uphold legislation defining such abandonment as a debt questioning since the
legislation is rationally related to upholding the goals of the Public Debt Clause.
196See supra Subsection II.B.4.

PUBLIC DEBT CLAUSE

43

There are two supplemental reasons for viewing the Clause as
allowing Congress to tie its own hands with a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
plan. First, the Public Debt Clause is inherently intertemporal, providing that
Congress may not renege on an earlier Congress’s budgetary commitments.
If Congress were to frame a Gramm-Rudman-Hollings scheme as a promise
to future purchasers of government securities that it will adhere to a specific
budgetary path, or if it incorporated such a promise directly in the bond
contract, then deviating from that path might be considered a default on that
promise. Second, the only type of legislation that could ensure the validity
of the public debt against the will of future Congresses is legislation that ties
Congress’s hands, so unless § 5 was not meant to apply to § 4, not enforcing
hand-tying legislation thwarts the Framers’ intent in § 5.197 The problem
with this analysis is that it seems too broad, since it would afford all debt
legislation quasi-constitutional status.198 But this problem vanishes if § 4
and § 5 are read together as allowing Congress to preclude its successors
from amending a debt-reduction statute in a way that would constitute a debt
questioning.
C.

Entitlements

Part I’s broad construction of what constitutes the “public debt”
gives encouragement to those who oppose cuts in Social Security and other
entitlement spending. After all, Social Security is a social contract providing
for insurance payments to be made in exchange for beneficiaries’ earlier
contributions.199 In essence, with Social Security and Medicare, the United
States has accumulated an “implicit pension debt”200 that the Constitution
protects.
Or so the argument goes. But there are reasons--textual,
jurisprudential, and practical--that protecting entitlements with the Public
Debt Clause begins to stretch the Clause’s meaning. First, the social contract
that Social Security embodies might not trigger the Clause, because the
government has not entered into written agreements with beneficiaries.
Second, Part I of this Article left open the question of whether the Clause is
197Professor

Seto similarly notes in the context of the Balanced Budget Amendment that a
provision giving Congress enforcement power might allow Congress to override the ordinary
rule that subsequent laws supersede prior laws. See Seto, supra note 10, at 1527.
198Indeed, such a reading might suggest that Congress may not repeal, or even amend, the
debt-limit statute. This would bludgeon Congress into crafting balanced budgets and could
lead to unconstitutional debt defaults if Congress failed.
199See, e.g., William G. Dauster, Protecting Social Security and Medicare, 33 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 461 (1996) (describing entitlement programs and urging continued funding).
200See Cheikh Kane & Robert Palacios, The Implicit Pension Debt, FIN. & DEV., June 1996,
at 36 (describing magnitude of unfunded pension obligations in both industrialized and
developing countries). The authors note that many countries’ debt promises are
constitutionally protected. Id. at 36.
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implicated when citizens are required to acquire government obligations.
Regardless of label, Social Security insurance contributions are a tax. Like
the last argument, this one draws a wall, perhaps artificial, between
agreements embodied in statutes and those on paper.
Third, the Supreme Court has held, though without considering the
Public Debt Clause, that Congress does have the right to cancel Social
Security payments. In Flemming v. Nestor,201 the Court ruled constitutional
a statute retroactively withdrawing Social Security benefits from aliens
deported for Communist Party affiliations. The Court noted that Congress
had reserved to itself “[t]he right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision” of
the Social Security Act,202 and found the beneficiary’s absence from the
United States a sufficient rationale for the statute to pass muster under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.203
The fourth, practical reason to be wary of arguments that the Public
Debt Clause protects entitlements is that such arguments transform the
Clause from a brake against fiscal chaos to an accelerator that could push
the economy off the fiscal cliff.204 If the government must meet its
entitlements promises, then it will need to pay for these promises with high
tax rates and drastic reduction in other government services.205 However, if
Congress waits too long to respond to the impending entitlements crisis,
anything might happen in the “generational warfare” that some say would
result.206 The Supreme Court could overrule Flemming because it failed to
consider the Public Debt Clause,207 or seize on the Flemming Court’s
201363

U.S. 603 (1960).
reservation remains in force. See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (1996).
203363 U.S. at 611-12.
204This practical concern may help to explain the Supreme Court’s disposition in Perry v.
United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935). See supra note 69 and accompanying text. Once the
government has accumulated debts that it cannot afford to pay, it may make ex post financial
sense to relieve the government of its obligations. Because the Public Debt Clause achieves
its purposes by tying Congress’s hands ex ante, such a rationale is constitutionally
insufficient. But it is understandable that the courts might subvert the Framers’ intent,
especially given the uncertainty of the government’s duty not to renege on entitlement
obligations, if enforcing those obligations would be economically disastrous.
205Of course, if it became clear in the near future that Congress will not be able to renege on
its entitlement obligations, Congress might prospectively reform the system by replacing the
pay-as-you-go approach with a fully funded, actuarially sound alternative. See James Tobin,
The Future of Social Security: One Economist’s Perspective, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND
THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 41 (Theodore R. Marmor & Jerry L. Mashaw eds., 1988)
(suggesting system linking contributions and benefits). Or, Congress might, as Charles Tiefer
predicts, budgetize entitlements entirely by subjecting them to the rigors of the
appropriations process. See Tiefer, supra note 122, at 459.
206See, e.g., John A Cutter, Tsongas Warns Against ‘Generational Warfare’, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at 7A.
207The Court also could overrule Flemming as incorrectly construing the Due Process
Clause. Charles Reich bitterly critiqued Flemming in his ultimately vindicated analysis of
“new property.” See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 768-71 (1964).
202This
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comment that its holding does not mean that “Congress may exercise its
power to modify the statutory scheme free of all constitutional restraint.” Id.
at 611. And if Congress were to place entitlement obligations on the full
faith and credit of the United States and issue written agreements promising
to honor them, the Flemming Court’s analysis would crumble and all bets
would be off on the applicability of the Public Debt Clause to entitlements.
IV.

Justiciability of the Public Debt Clause

To demonstrate that the federal courts would have jurisdiction over
claims filed by debt-holders under the Public Debt Clause, this Part surveys
the sovereign immunity, standing, political questions, and ripeness
doctrines, as well as separation-of-powers considerations that overlap these
areas. Under one view of justiciability, this separate inquiry ought not be
required. William Fletcher has argued in the context of standing that the
justiciability question is on the merits.208 Courts, according to Fletcher,
should grant standing to anyone in whom the relevant constitutional or
statutory provision sued upon grants legal rights. Similar analyses are
possible for other prerequisites to jurisdiction;209 for example, a case would
be ripe when a legal injury occurred under a particular provision’s definition
of injury. Under these formulations, this Article’s justiciability analysis is
done, because the Article conceptualizes the Public Debt Clause as investing
legal rights against the United States in debt-holders. Thus, in this view, the
Clause overrides sovereign immunity, grants standing, does not delegate a
political question to a co-equal branch, creates ripe cases whenever the debt
has been questioned, and provides a check on the legislative branch.
The Supreme Court has not embraced this mode of analysis. For
example, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,210 the Court held that the
Endangered Species Act’s grant of citizen standing exceeded the bounds of
the Article III judicial power. In nullifying an explicit congressional vesting
of a legal right, the Court perpetuated its “injury in fact” jurisprudence.211
This test stands in direct opposition to Fletcher’s approach, which assesses
legal injuries instead of reading a limit to adjudicable harms into Article III.
Thus, this Article must conduct an independent analysis of the current state

But the Court has so far followed Flemming, holding in 1986 that the Social Security Act
created no contractual or property rights. See Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed To Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 55 (1986).
208William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988).
209See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1427 (1987)
(arguing that “governments have neither ‘sovereignty’ nor ‘immunity’ to violate the
Constitution”).
210504 U.S. 555 (1992).
211See id. at 562–63 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35 (1992).
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of justiciability law to determine whether there is any remedy to those
governmental practices that the Article brands unconstitutional.
This Part argues that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not
sap the Public Debt Clause of its relevance. This discussion inevitably veers
from the Clause’s core, but its conclusions underscore that the private rights
protected by the Clause provide a means to enforcing public values.
Justiciability doctrines may well endanger many constitutional challenges to
the Congress’s administration of fiscal policy,212 but the Public Debt
Clause’s protection of debt-holders provides an anchor on which jurisdiction
rests comfortably. Although Part III is motivated by the concern that
financial mismanagement may impair the general welfare, it is not this
diffuse interest but rather the specific financial injury potentially suffered by
debt-holders that leads to its conclusions. The Public Debt Clause paves the
road to judicial enforcement by conferring rights in a class of individuals
whose financial interests are aligned with the social interest of sound
financial management that motivates this Article.
A.

Sovereign Immunity

Waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed,213 but
Congress’s grants of waivers would cover an action by debt-holders. First,
the Tucker Act214 granted the sovereign’s clear permission to be sued for
money damages on an express contract. Indeed, in Perry v. United States,215
the Supreme Court held that the Claims Court would have had jurisdiction
were the petitioner’s calculations of damages correct, but that it could not
take jurisdiction over claims for nominal damages.216 Therefore, if the
government were to repudiate a bond debt, or another debt founded on an
express contract, a debt-holder could sue the United States for damages.
Second, the United States has consented to suits for relief for other than
money damages, as long as the suit is nominally filed against an agency or
an official.217 A debt-holder could therefore file for declaratory judgment218
212See,

e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, 65 U.S.L.W. 2052
(D.D.C. July 3, 1996) (denying standing in challenge to Line Item Veto Act); Crosthwait,
supra note 10 (arguing that Balanced Budget Amendment would be nonjusticiable); Ondrea
D. Riley, Comment, Annual Federal Deficit Spending: Sending the Judiciary to the Rescue,
34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 594–601 (1994) (assessing standing barriers to challenges of
debt accumulation, without considering Public Debt Clause).
213See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 318 (1986) (requiring courts to
“construe waivers strictly in favor of the sovereign”).
214Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2),
1491(a)(1) (1996)).
215294 U.S. 330 (1935).
216Id. at 355.
217See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1996).
218See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 (1996).
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against the Treasury. A taxpayer might, for example, seek a declaration that
the federal debt-limit statute or other statute constituting a “debt
questioning” is unconstitutional, without violating the United States’s
sovereign immunity.
The more difficult question is whether the United States would have
sovereign immunity if Congress passed a statute withdrawing its consent to
suit. In the context of the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause, the
Court has stated that “it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for
interference with property rights amounting to a taking” and thus waives
sovereign immunity.219 The Court could apply similar reasoning to the
Public Debt Clause, or could read the Clause in tandem with the Just
Compensation Clause to require compensation for debt repudiations. Indeed,
the Perry Court suggested that there might be some limit on Congress’s
power to make an end-run around the United States’s duty to fulfill its credit
obligations.220 This suggestion recognizes that a key justification of
sovereign immunity--“that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends”221--does not apply
to constitutional provisions in general and to the Public Debt Clause in
particular, since the Clause’s purpose is to bind Congress to its earlier
commitments. However, in the only case to consider whether Congress may
withdraw its consent to suit in a case arising under the Clause, the Court of
Claims held that sovereign immunity did protect such a withdrawal.222

219First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316
n.9 (1987).
220See Perry, 294 U.S. at 353 (“The Congress as the instrumentality of sovereignty is
endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the people in the manner and with
the effect the Constitution ordains. The Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power of the
people to override their will as thus declared.”). Later language makes the import of this
statement unclear. See id. at 354 (“While the Congress is under no duty to provide remedies
through the courts, the contractual obligation still exists and, despite infirmities of procedure,
remains binding upon the conscience of the sovereign.”)
221Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Holmes, J.).
222Gold Bondholders Protective Council, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 643 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
The case was a delayed Gold Clause action concerning a 1918 bond. After Perry v. United
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), the Congress had withdrawn its consent to be sued in cases
arising under the gold clause provisions of U.S. securities. See 31 U.S.C. § 773b (1983). The
court noted, “In an unbroken line of decisions, it has been held that Congress may withdraw
its consent to sue the Government at any time,” and interpreted dicta in Perry as implying
that the Public Debt Clause did not affect this principle. 676 F.2d at 646. But cf. Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment overrides sovereign
immunity of states under Eleventh Amendment); analogously, the courts could hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause overrides the federal government’s sovereign
immunity.
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Standing

Although the Supreme Court’s approach to standing is at best
confused,223 debt-holders almost certainly have the concrete interest in
relevant aspects of government fiscal management that the general public
lacks. In Allen v. Wright,224 Justice O’Connor noted that “application of the
constitutional standing requirement [cannot be] a mechanical exercise,” but
stated that the injury alleged must be “distinct and palpable,” “traceable to
the challenged action,” and “not ‘abstract’ or ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’” Repudiation of debts creates a direct and substantial injury,
so a challenge to such repudiation would clear these Allen hurdles.
Moreover, even restrictive standing decisions have required only that the
plaintiff “personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.”225
Therefore, the possibility of injury from, for example, the federal debt-limit
statute would be sufficient to allow debt-holders standing to sue on the
theory that a debt has been questioned.
A counterargument would equate bondholder standing with
taxpayer standing. The government obtains revenue both by borrowing and
taxation, so, the argument concludes, bondholders should not have standing
where taxpayers would lack it. This argument misses a critical distinction
between bondholders and taxpayers: Bondholders, in addition perhaps to the
satisfaction of helping fund government programs that may benefit them,
have a right to a return on the money they provide. Bondholders would have
no greater right than taxpayers to challenge the situation in Allen, in which
parents of black school children were concerned that the IRS granting of
tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools would adversely affect
their children’s ability to receive an education. Bondholders would have
standing, however, to challenge any policy that threatened to burden them
with a financial loss, just as taxpayers have standing to attack the
constitutionality of tax laws imposing burdens on them. Like such
taxpayers, bondholders may well be concerned less about their financial
well-being than about the state of constitutional law and government
financial management, but public-spiritedness has never deprived a plaintiff
with a concrete interest in a case’s outcome of standing.

223Compare

Flast v. Cohen, 393 U.S. 83 (1968) (allowing taxpayer standing to challenge of
government spending in Establishment Clause case), with Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying
standing in similar case).
224468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
225Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441
U.S. 91, 99 (1979)) (emphasis added).
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Political Questions

The political question prong of justiciability bars adjudication of
constitutional questions where there is “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it . . . .”226 A requirement that “Congress shall ensure the validity of the
public debt” might be a delegation of the constitutional issue to Congress,
but the passive language of the Public Debt Clause suggests that all the
branches of government share the responsibility of ensuring that the debt not
be questioned. In addition, although the language of the Public Debt Clause
does not eliminate ambiguity, this Article outlines manageable standards for
interpreting it.227 Certainly the Clause is no less conducive to the adoption of
judicial standards than are other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
which the courts have added a thick gloss.
D.

Ripeness

The ripeness doctrine’s “basic rationale is to prevent the courts,
through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in
abstract disagreements . . . .”228 Government default is not required to make
a disagreement concrete; a debt questioning will do. If a governmental
action is found to be a debt questioning under an objective test, then the
action has increased the risk of default and thus lowered the value of debt,
decreasing the wealth of debt-holders. If a subjective test identifies a debt
questioning, then the public is suspicious of a debt’s validity and the debt
will thus be harder to sell. Either way, a debt questioning inflicts a financial
injury. While debtholders may be less concerned about these small injuries
than about the possibility of greater injury in the future, the Supreme Court
has made clear that immediate, collateral injuries are sufficient to make
cases justiciable.229
E.

Separation of Powers

Separation-of-powers considerations provide perhaps the most
formidable obstacle to the Public Debt Clause. These considerations have
independent significance, but have also been folded into the standing and
political questions inquiries. For example, in Valley Forge, the Court noted
226Baker

v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
supra Subsection II.B.4.
228Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967).
229See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (finding ripe
suit challenging constitutionality of law limiting liability in event of nuclear accident,
because presence of plant would lead to additional, immediate environmental injury).
227See
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that a plaintiff may have standing only if a federal court is capable of
dispensing relief consistent with the separation of powers.230 Also bounded
up with separation of powers are “prudential questions” about the wisdom of
judicial involvement in a particular area, though this may have lost vitality
as an independent doctrine.231
Separation-of-powers questions require analysis of whether the
courts have the power to order a remedy. Invocation of the Public Debt
Clause to invalidate a debt repudiation or the federal debt-limit statute
would be an unremarkable exercise of the judicial “duty . . . to say what the
law is.”232 The application of the Clause to excessive debt accumulation is
more troubling. While the courts might issue a mandamus ordering that the
deficit be lowered, congressional defiance of such an order would leave the
courts without recourse, since rewriting a budget is a quintessentially
legislative task that inevitably implicates economic value judgments other
than debt reduction.233 One solution would be to resolve such cases by
granting only money damages; bondholders would be compensated for any
decline in the value of their bonds attributable to debt questioning. This
approach is workable, but perhaps not a vindication of the Public Debt
Clause’s values. First, it would exacerbate debt accumulation and thus lead
to increased questioning of the remaining portion of the debt. Second,
without some form of injunctive relief, it would allow unconstitutional debt
accumulation to continue.
Passage of a debt-reduction statute pursuant to § 4 and § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment234 would allay separation-of-powers concerns. First,
if Congress were to pass a statute tying its hands, later judicial enforcement
of this Congress’s will against the will of a future Congress would be less
countermajoritarian than garden-variety judicial review. The enforcement
would be consistent with the will of a Congress and would reflect the
people’s desire to create time-inconsistent policies, i.e. policies that produce
optimal results ex ante only by precluding later exercise of policymaking
discretion.235 Second, such a statute could mitigate the difficulty of crafting
230454

U.S. at 473-74; see also Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of
Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea--the idea of separation of powers.”);
Crosthwait, supra note 10, at 1107 n.31. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)
(asserting that separation-of-powers is part of political questions inquiry but not standing).
231See Crosthwait, supra note 10, at 1089 (arguing that “prudential doctrine is so ill-defined
that it is of little use to courts faced with difficult justiciability questions”). But see Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 253 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (maintaining that political
questions doctrine derives “in large part from prudential concerns about the respect we owe
the political departments”).
232Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
233Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Constitution does not prefer certain economic policies over others).
234See supra Subsection III.B.2.
235See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather than Discretion: The
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a judicial remedy. By providing a congressionally approved sequestration
method, a statute pursuant to § 4 and § 5 would provide a default rule that
judges could return to if a later statute were held to breach the Public Debt
Clause.
V.

Conclusion

Although the Public Debt Clause is underdeveloped, it is not a
constitutional relic. The language and history of the Clause indicate that it
was not merely a prohibition on the repudiation of Civil War bonds. Rather,
the Clause was and is a promise that Congress will pay its debts. The Clause
applies at least to governmental promises embodied in written agreements
with debt-holders, and Congress cannot take any action making it possible
that the government will break such promises. As a result, not only would a
governmental failure during a budget impasse to make bond or other debt
payments be unconstitutional, but the federal debt-limit statute making such
an impasse possible is also invalid. Moreover, Congress cannot indulge in
unsustainable debt accumulation, and it may be able to ensure the debt’s
validity by passing debt-reduction legislation that it could not easily repeal.
While Congress probably may exercise its reserved right to repudiate its
entitlement promises, it might secure those promises by invoking the Public
Debt Clause. Suits by debt-holders to enforce the Clause would be
justiciable.
Perhaps this interpretation of the Public Debt Clause and its
application reflect only the Constitution that was at the time of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and the Constitution that might have
been in the time since. But to some extent it has also described the
Constitution that has been. For although the Supreme Court has not
developed the Public Debt Clause, it has strained to find its core elsewhere.
The Court has read a version of the Contracts Clause, which applies only to
states, into the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,236 though the Public
Debt Clause seems textually like a better hinge for this holding. And the
Court has recognized that statutes may vest recipients of government
benefits with property interests that cannot be taken away without
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1977). Professors Kydland and
Prescott show that optimal control theory may not apply to dynamic economic systems. In
other words, when expectations of future policy influence policy effectiveness, a timeinconsistent policy, i.e. one that prevents policymakers from taking the optimal path at each
point in time, may be ex ante optimal. This insight is relevant to debt because a government
that can tie its own hands through time-inconsistent policy changes expectations and reaps
the lower interest-rate benefits of higher confidence in its bond issues. See also Guillermo A.
Calvo, Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 647 (1988)
(arguing that expectation of debt repudiation makes such repudiation more likely).
236See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (2d ed. 1988).
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procedural due process.237 These efforts recognize an attractive principle:
The Government should not be able to ignore its promises.
This Article asks that the courts use the Public Debt Clause to
amplify this principle in the context of congressional budgeting. Although
the courts have shown no proclivity to move in this direction, they have not
been given the opportunity. Either a suit by bondholders or a decision by
Congress to invoke the Clause directly would provide a test case that the
courts might use to resuscitate this Clause. And so perhaps this Article has
done more than excoriate Congress and the courts for not ensuring the
government’s fiscal honor; perhaps it has offered a vision of the Fiscal
Constitution that might still be.

237See

Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

